What did the ceasefire agreement (CFA) impose on both sides? It ushered in a ‘no war, no peace’ situation. The February 2002 agreement had four articles. Article 1 dealt with the separation of the fighting forces; Article 2 dealt with measures necessary to bring normalcy to civilian life in the northeast; Article 3 stipulated the duties and obligations of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (comprising Nordic monitors from Iceland, Finland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden); and Article 4 contained the standard exit clauses on how the agreement could be terminated by either party. The agreement emphasised security issues, particularly military strategic parity, not political solutions; furthermore, it stabilised the lines of control acquired by the LTTE in the northern and eastern parts of the country. Despite frequent violations by both sides, particularly since 2006, the CFA acted as a check on an open declaration of war. From 2002-2006, the SLMM found that the government had violated the CFA 346 times and the LTTE, 3827 times. The LTTE used the ceasefire to attain international legitimacy and to build a de facto state in the north with armed forces, bureaucracy, courts and police under the control of Prabhakaran. The Sri Lankan government used the CFA to rebuild its arsenal and military.

Why did the government decide to end the ceasefire? The timing suggests that recent victories, including the re-capture of the east by the Sri Lankan military and the killings of senior leaders including the chiefs of the LTTE’s political and secret service wings, may have emboldened the government. In late November, President Rajapakse said that LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran was dead, or at least gravely wounded, by an air attack on his bunker. The LTTE later denied it. A rudderless LTTE or at least an incapacitated one may have provided the impetus to the government to back a military solution to the conflict.

But this approach by the Rajapakse presidency fails to appreciate that ethnic conflicts cannot be won on the battlefield; they need a political resolution. The international community has condemned the Sri Lankan government’s actions, and several states, including the US, have already stopped military supplies to Sri Lanka.

What does the end of the CFA portend for a resolution to the conflict? First, despite optimism in Sri Lankan government circles, there is no end in sight. The problem is neither side is powerful enough to win nor weak enough to lose the war but both believe that they can win militarily.

Second, the exit of international mediators (however ineffective) is worrying, because in intractable conflicts where distrust between combatants is high, it is important to have third parties who could act as a check.

Third, India, which is the only credible mediator, has been reluctant to get enmeshed again in the island’s deadly struggle, having lost 1200 soldiers and a former prime minister in the late 1980s. In the last decade, Indian foreign policy privileged institutional and multilateral solutions to the conflict by following a three-fold strategy: “track 2” political engagement with Sinhalese and Tamil democratic parties (hence not LTTE) to strengthen acceptance of devolution and power-sharing, economic aid to all regions, and some security ties including giving defensive and “non-lethal equipment” to the Sri Lankan military.

The importance being given to the ruling coalition of Tamil Nadu’s DMK party, which is considered to be soft on the LTTE makes it unlikely that India will change its policy. However, the episodic influx of refugees (150,000 from the northeast) into Tamil Nadu and the use of the state as a conduit for arms smuggling to the LTTE, and the more recent use by the LTTE of the Indian stock markets make it impossible for India to ignore the Sri Lankan crisis, but neither can it do anything when neither side is willing to listen. More waves of refugees can be expected to arrive on Indian shores.

A viable peace in Sri Lanka has to be imposed but the exit from the CFA has shut the window (at least temporarily) for the international community’s involvement.

The writer is a fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi

shylashris@gmail.com