The port was formally inaugurated in March 2007, and the Pakistan navy was reported to have set up a base in the port. It may be noted that all oil tankers from the Gulf, bound for the Gulf of Kutch pass about 40 nautical miles south of Gwadar port and would be within the range of Gwadar-based coastal radar and missile batteries and also PN units operating from the port. Some media reports indicate the possible (unconfirmed) presence of a Chinese electronic ‘listening post’ at Gwadar.

To fully understand the serious strategic implications for India, we need to note that much of India’s oil imports come by sea, from the Gulf, with tankers exiting through the straits of Hormuz. Seventy per cent of our imported oil arrives at ports in the Gulf of Kutch, the Gulf of Cambay and at Mumbai port. In fact, in 2007, the Gulf of Kutch received 1100 oil tankers (which pass closely by Gwadar), and the number will grow to over 4000 tanker ships by 2025, when India’s oil imports would have quadrupled to 320 million tonnes (China’s imports would also have risen to over 600 million tonnes and hence the possibility of conflict of interests between these two largest consumers of oil). Similarly, the ships carrying imported oil from the Mumbai and Cambay ports will increase manifold.

The global strategic implications are also serious, since the Gulf region has 75 per cent of the worlds proven oil reserves and half of the world’s proven gas reserves. About 15.5 million barrels of oil pass through the straits of Hormuz daily on tanker ships (worth over $200 billion, annually). This amounts to over 90 per cent of the oil exported by the Gulf region and over 40 per cent of the entire world’s oil trade. All this oil passes very close to the Gwadar port. It can be reasonably assumed that Gwadar’s facilities can be made available to the Chinese navy, even though Pakistan tried to allay fears last year by signing on the Singapore PSA to operate the port for 40 years.

... contd.