What is evident in the flurry of meetings, from New Delhi to Nagpur, is the growing realisation that on November 26 night, all systems that could have prevented a 26/11 failed.

INTELLIGENCE

Even on the morning of 26/11, a communication asking for activation of 10 SIM cards was picked up by the R&AW on the Bangladesh border. Intelligence agencies failed to decipher its significance. At 9.21 pm, the attack began

IB chief Haldar and his R&AW counterpart Ashok Chaturvedi failed to act on the top-secret alert (see the scanned document below) sent to then Maharashtra DG P S Pasricha on November 20, 2007. Haldar wrote to Pasricha that reliable inputs indicated that the LeT was planning a major terrorist strike and the action might involve “fidayeen attack, stand-off firing and use of grenades”. Even though the exact target had not been disclosed, he added, the operation could involve taking hostages. Asking the DG to sensitise his officers, Haldar promised to revert “as soon as” more information was available. Even as Special Director, Multi-Agency Centre (MAC), Haldar had written to Pasricha on August 7, 2006, and given details of specific targets in Maharashtra.

However, Haldar never reverted back to Pasricha, despite the promise, till four days after the Marriot Hotel bombing in Islamabad. On September 20, 2008, Joint Director (MAC) IB Ashok Prasad alerted the Maharashtra DG (the scanned document on top) that the LeT was planning an attack in Mumbai and identified Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, Vallabbhai Patel Stadium, Sea Rock or Taj Land's End Hotel, Mumbai Juhu airfield and JW Marriot Hotel as likely targets.

... contd.