But the Chinese used talks in a variety of ways to advance their interests and had little hesitation in supping with the devil if it was so warranted. History records that when there were no formal links between the US and China in the early fifties and tension mounted over the Taiwan issue, Chinese leaders entered into the Warsaw talks in 1958 — where the ambassadors of the two countries to Poland met intermittently. And, as is well-known, these talks continued for a full 13 years until the famous Nixon-Kissinger breakthrough with Beijing in 1971. Closer home, the Sino-Indian border talks under the aegis of the JWG is still a work in progress, and consensual resolution a distant prospect.

There is a need, therefore, to define both a time-line and an agenda for the current intra-UPA talks so that they do not become protracted or inconclusive. If the Left parties are seeking clarification, surely this can be provided in a few days’ time by the government and may not require putting the nuclear deal on hold. Alternatively, if it is the objective of the Left to extend the talks well beyond September, then they have already realised this goal with the amber light being flashed by the Congress leadership.

The debate in India, after the text of the 123 agreement was made public on August 3, is mired in political contradictions. Most national polls — the India-Bharat divide notwithstanding — are hugely in favour of obtaining the benefits of the deal. The US is perceived as a repository of opportunity in this era of globalisation. This explains why most young Indians are more likely to head towards the US than, say, Russia or China today.

... contd.