Alliance for Democracy (PAD) which overthrew Thaksin Shinawatra’s government.

There were claims that Thaksin’s government was corrupt; allegations were made and charges levelled against Thaksin and his wife, Potjaman. Paramount among these allegations was the nature of the sale of the Shinawatra family’s shares of Shin Corporation (a Thai telecommunication conglomerate) to Singapore-based Temasek Holdings. Allegations included tax evasion and exemption; however, due to the nature and changes of the Thai constitution, their legality can be questioned. This sale rubbed up against the preferred policies of the hyper-nationalists — the “old elites” — of Bangkok society, who viewed Thaksin’s populist economic policies and attempts at decentralising power as a threat to their traditional leadership role, a challenge to the status quo. They arranged for a consortium of cronies to take to the streets — the PAD. The result was another military government, a new constitution, which replaced the 1997 constitution, which had been generally heralded as the most democratic constitution thus far. However, what is often not mentioned is the deep support from rural Thailand for Thaksin’s policies, support based on results — World Bank estimates are that during Thaksin’s tenure poverty fell from 21.3 per cent in 2001 to 11.3 per cent in 2004, and farming incomes rose by around 40 per cent.

Following the collapse of military rule further elections were held, and a “proxy” to Thaksin under the People Power Party (PPP) took office. The PAD, which abandoned activities after Thaksin’s fall, once again took to the streets. The PAD is a group of royalist businessmen, intellectuals, academics, and activists from Bangkok who want to maintain the current status quo. Opposed to foreign investment and trade-led development in Thailand, they have consistently challenged economic policies that would improve public welfare. The demands of the PAD under the “new politics” are undemocratic and regressive, arguing for “reform” of the electoral system which would restrict national suffrage to those who are “educated and informed”. This would mean that 70 per cent of the population would be left without the right to vote, and power would be transferred to an assembly which would appoint judges — the so-called “functional democracy” approach. Further demands include that MPs be elected on the basis of occupation and rank.

A lot of upheavals have affected Thai society but the current situation seems to be very high on the list. The appointment of Wongsawat, given that he is the brother-in-law of Thaksin will most likely exacerbate the existing complicated cycle of Thai politics. The military may well once again intervene and come into power, an interim government may be put in control, after which it is uncertain if the Bangkok elites will in fact succeed in ensuring their position or if, instead, a democratic body will emerge. The likelihood of the current PM’s success is very low, the protesters have refused to accept anyone from PPP assuming power.

The situation would be controlled if there were an actual separation in the different bodies of government. The three separate chambers are in fact intertwined; the judiciary seems more like an instrument rather than a decision-maker, and the army’s direct involvement complicated the political make-up even further. Similar developments can be seen in Pakistan with a newly elected democratic President — Asif Ali Zardari — who nevertheless both benefits and is hurt by his relationship with a controversial former prime minister. Thailand and Pakistan have a similar past of successive military and democratic governments; both are questionable as “real” democracies.

So far the protests have been largely peaceful, except for one death and several injured. However, this new appointment might result in further protests. Thailand has a harsh history with protest; in the 1976 Uprising the military brutally killed several hundreds. The current military position, under its chief Paojinda, is that it refuses to utilise force to remove the PAD from Government House. The potential risk is the abolition of democracy, the death of several hundreds and the continuation of undemocratic politics. This is not a battle between political parties but rather between two factions of Bangkok (Thai) society — the traditionalists and the reformists. The old elites are up in arms against the new elites, and the result is the neglect of millions who are unable to influence politics. Should the protesters succeed once again, the masses might potentially lose their right to vote and democracy in Thailand will once again be an aspiration rather than a reality.

alia.allana@expressindia.com