That’s because China’s rapid arms buildup has generated apprehension worldwide. Defence spending in 2008 rose by nearly 18 per cent to almost $45 billion, the biggest increase since 2002. China has announced double digit military spending increases nearly every year since the early ’90s and its defence expenditure has increased by an average of about 15 per cent a year from 1990 to 2005. Yet the declared military spending by China only represents about a third of its actual military spending, if equipment purchases are taken into account. The rest of the world is making a concerted bid to engage China on military issues so as to remove the veil of secrecy that surrounds China’s military plans and spending.  

But while China’s white paper makes it clear that moving from infantry to high-tech naval and aerial warfare is a major goal, and it does talk about China’s plans to build new types of submarines, destroyers, frigates and aircrafts, no mention is made of aircraft carriers or of nuclear-powered submarines equipped with ballistic missiles, both expected to be added in the next couple of years. The white paper offers no budgetary specifics, thereby not improving the transparency about Chinese defence spending — the ostensible reason for the papers. This year China will begin construction of two medium-sized aircraft carriers, and with a refurbished 55,000-tonne Soviet built Kuznetsov-class carrier, the Varyag, China will have three operational aircraft carriers in the next 5-6 years. This will have a profound impact on Beijing’s regional power projection. In the first-ever deployment of Chinese warships in distant waters, its navy is working to combat Somalian piracy. China intends to further develop its capabilities to operate effectively in distant waters. 

One of the lessons China’s military has seemingly learnt from recent wars is that technological sophistication is the sine qua non for effective military operations in the contemporary strategic environment. Since 2003, the world’s biggest standing army has been gradually shrinking and has been reduced to 2.3 million soldiers, with spending now focused on better training and advanced state-of-the-art weaponry. China intends to reach the strategic goal of building informationised armed forces and being capable of winning informationised wars by the mid-21st century.

While not mentioning the US by name, the paper makes a comparison between the present superpower and the emerging one. In contrast to a unilateralist America that apparently seeks to enfeeble China “by supporting diplomatic struggles with military means,” China itself, according to the latest document, “will never seek hegemony or engage in military expansion now or in the future, no matter how developed it becomes.” Interestingly, the paper underlines growing Chinese unease about changing policies of the US in Asia suggesting that “the US has increased its strategic attention to and input in the Asia-Pacific region, further consolidating its military alliances, adjusting its military deployment and enhancing its military capabilities.” 

India needs to urgently review its defence preparedness vis-à-vis China. As the policy paralysis post- Mumbai has revealed, we seem to have lost our conventional superiority vis-à-vis Pakistan. The real challenge for India, however, lies in China’s rise as military power. If the latest white paper is any indication, China already views itself as a superpower-in-waiting and despite all the lofty pronouncements, a Chinese hegemony in the region will adversely impact upon Indian interests. The Indian government owes it to the nation to set this imbalance right.  

While India should be concerned about Beijing’s long-term strategic intentions, there are also lessons to be learnt. Even as China continues to pursue its national security objectives through careful defence planning and expenditure, Indian defence planning remains ad hoc in nature with no clearly defined end-state. The real issue in India’s case is effective management of available budgetary resources because a developing, democratic country like India will always be constrained in what it can spend on defence. While a major portion of the military budget continues to go towards revenue expenditure, India continues to lag behind in investing in research and development — which means it continues to rely on other countries for cutting-edge technologies, thereby perpetuating the vicious cycle. This is mainly due to the fact that India doesn’t have a coherent national security strategy that maps out its long-term security challenges along with concomitant defence planning. Effective defence planning and force structuring require a coherent grand strategy and an appropriate institutional framework, something that India has somehow never found the will to develop. It is here, rather than in matching defence expenditure figure by figure, that India should try to emulate China. 

The writer teaches at King’s College, London

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