The unfolding power struggle in Islamabad is not merely about the future of Musharraf and Pakistan; its outcome could well define the prospects of the global war on terror, the future of the northwestern parts of the subcontinent, and the peace process with India.

The consequences of the deepening political crisis in Pakistan — a nuclear armed state that has been sucked into a shooting war between the US and NATO forces on the one hand and the al-Qaeda and the Taliban on the other — are global. That in turn, would suggest significant international involvement in managing Pakistan’s internal turmoil.

India, on its part, needs to encourage the trends towards a structural change in Pakistan in favour of democratic consolidation, civilian control over military, and a reconciliation with the neighbours.

While hoping for the best, India must necessarily brace for the worst — the civilian leaders might be forced, once again, to bend before the entrenched institutional power of Pakistan Army.

Pakistan’s civilian leaders are easily set upon each other. Acting together, Musharraf and the Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kiani, have the wherewithal to divide the civilian leaders once again and overpower the popular political aspirations for democratic governance.

A return to either direct or indirect military rule, with Musharraf choosing to sack the elected government with Army’s blessing — is bound to plunge Pakistan into a deeper crisis and push the region towards a wider conflict.

In a paradox, Musharraf was widely seen, until a year ago, in India and the world, as the only credible agent of Pakistan’s long overdue evolution towards political moderation, social modernisation and regional harmony.

After the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, Musharraf emerged as the most valued US ally in the war on terror. After a series of military confrontations with India, Musharraf led Pakistan into a sustained engagement with India since 2004.

That he was unable to deliver decisive results in either curbing the al-Qaeda and the Taliban or clinching the peace process with India did not underline Musharraf’s personal failure, but the contradictions at the very heart of Pak Army’s corporate interests that he represented.

It took nearly seven years for the Bush Administration to acknowledge that Musharraf and the Pakistani Army were playing both sides in the war on terror and confront Islamabad with evidence of the ISI’s role in the continuing destabilisation of Afghanistan.

The Pakistan Army never gave up its ambition to control the developments in Afghanistan. Its focus since 9/11 was on managing, what it perceived as temporary, American and NATO pressures on international terrorism originating from the Pak-Afghan border.

Thanks to the Pakistan Army’s obsessive search for ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan, the ‘Great Game’ is now being played out on Pakistan’s own territory.

With India, too, Musharraf and the Army chose to calibrate, rather than abandon, cross-border terrorism as an instrument of policy.

Despite a promising negotiation with India on Jammu and Kashmir, first under NDA’s Atal Bihari Vajpayee and then under the UPA Government, the Pakistan Army and the ISI repeatedly unleashed terror all across India.

In the last few months, the peace process has come under greater stress with the Pakistan Army and the ISI returning to bad old ways — violating the ceasefire on the Line of Control in J&K, stepping up support to cross-border terrorism, and bombing the Indian embassy in Kabul.

Despite these provocations, New Delhi has been rather sensible in explicitly differentiating between Pakistan’s civilian leaders who want to build on the peace process with India and the Army that is desperate to undermine it.

In the coming days and weeks, New Delhi will have to further develop this nuanced approach with one paramount political objective in mind — rejigging Pakistan’s internal political balance in favour of elected leaders and civilian control over the Army and the ISI.

India always loomed large over Pakistan’s domestic politics. New Delhi must find ways to effectively exercising that power. That is best done by India actively cooperating with other great powers like the United States, regional players like Saudi Arabia which have considerable influence in Islamabad, and neighbours like Iran and Afghanistan, to nudge Pakistan in the right direction.

(The writer is a Professor at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore)