Three months and four days later into that year, the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament pushed Pakistan to the verge of an all-out war with India with New Delhi accusing two major jihadi groups based in Pakistan for the attack. New Delhi asked Pakistan to hand over 20 men, who included the leadership of the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Pakistan flatly refused. Though the threat of war subsided with serious international, especially American diplomatic intervention, President Musharraf’s January 6 speech came as a big breather. Musharraf promised that Pakistan would not allow any terror attack to emanate from its territory and subsequently banned Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad.

Since 2002, the Pakistani government has fought Taliban and al-Qaeda even at the cost of serious setbacks to its internal security, especially along its western border. But Pakistan’s efforts at tightening the noose around groups waging war against India have been extremely difficult though Musharraf’s regime did launch a crackdown against militant groups leading to a substantial decrease in violence in Kashmir.

So why is it impossible for Pakistan’s government to hand over Lashkar ideologue Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed to New Delhi when it did not hesitate to arrest Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and other al-Qaeda men for the Americans?

This difference in intensity and focus while confronting jihadi groups active against the United States in Afghanistan and India are seen as a dichotomy in Pakistan’s policy. It’s this contradiction that provides Pakistan with a strategic edge. A military escalation with India threatens to shift Pakistan’s focus from the war against Taliban, jeopardising US interests in the region. This makes a US intervention to prevent a military confrontation between India and Pakistan a guaranteed fact. But it is impossible for Pakistan’s government to go against militant groups on New Delhi’s behest. Since its creation, the Kashmir dispute has been at the core of Pakistan’s very existence. Unlike Afghanistan, Kashmir has traditionally been a major influence on Pakistan’s domestic as well as foreign policy. Though the Pakistani government launched a crackdown after the Parliament attack, it insisted that this shift did not mean it was abandoning its support to separatists in Kashmir.

Deobandi Taliban vs Salafi Lashkar

The other aspect that influences Pakistan’s policy is to do with ideological and demographic differences between the Taliban and the Lashkar. The Taliban movement in Afghanistan and Pakistan is primarily based on the Deobandi school of thought while the Lashkar is Salafi. Deobandis belong to the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence and follow Imam Abu Hanifa while the Salafis do not follow any particular Imam and consider the Quran and Hadith as their only guide. Apart from the differences in the practice of religion, while Deobandis in Pakistan seek the establishment of an Islamic State in its letter and spirit and even favour a jihad against the establishment, the Salafis do not support rebellion against the government in a Muslim country and rather advocate reform to turn the ruling elite into “Muslims at heart”. This Salafi non-confrontationist approach towards Pakistan’s ruling elite is shaped by the teachings of Imam Ibn-e-Taymiyah—a major influence in the Salafi movement worldwide. This means that Lashkar or its parent organisation, the Markaz-e-Dawa-wal-Irshad, was never a security risk for the Pakistani state.

The Lashkar’s origins

In 1986, Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed and two other Pakistani professors—Dr Zaffar Iqbal (who took Abu Hamza as his alias) and Hafiz Abdur Rehman Makki, who is also a close relative of Sayeed—set up the Markaz-e-Dawa wal Irshad (Centre for Preaching and Guidance).

Sayeed, a professor in the Islamic Studies Department of the University of Engineering and Technology (Lahore), had been to Saudi Arabia for higher education in Islamic Studies, where he and the others got together with Saudi ulemas at the Madinah University. The connecting link and a major influence was Sheikh Abdullah Azzam—a Palestinian from Jenin refugee camp—who had links with Ikhawan-ul-Muslimoon (Muslim Brotherhood) of Egypt and a well-known ideologue of Afghan jihad. Soon after his return from Saudi Arabia, he along with the two other professors set up the Markaz in Muridke near Lahore.

A year later, the Lashkar-e-Toiba was launched with an aim to participate in the ... Afghan war. Its militants fought the Russians in the Jaji area of Paknea province along with the Afghan mujahideen outfit Itihad-e-Islami. But as the Afghan war was at its fag end, the group decided to shift its attention to Kashmir. According to security agencies, its Valley operations began in 1993. For years, the group kept a low profile, so much so that government agencies had little clue about its ideology and cadre. The first sensational attack carried out by the outfit was in July 1999, soon after the Kargil war, when it launched a fidayeen attack on a BSF camp in Bandipore. This brought the outfit and its top ideologue Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed in focus and ever since that July attack, the Lashkar and Sayeed have remained in the headlines.

In fact, this Salafi group was in absolute conformity with Pakistan’s policy till 9/11 blurred the line dividing armed movements and terrorism internationally. And this is why Musharraf’s decision to ban the Lashkar was seen as a major step even as it did not match New Delhi’s demands.Almost a month ahead of Pakistan’s ban on Lashkar, Sayeed called a press conference on December 24, 2001, and officially distanced himself from the Lashkar, closed down the Markaz-Dawa-wal-Irshad and instead set up Jamat-ud-Dawa with an exclusive aim of dawa (preaching) and charity. In fact, the Dawa describes itself as "a multi-purpose movement that aims to spread the true teachings of Islam" which "works peacefully, regardless of the circumstances in the country (Pakistan)". Before Pakistan’s ban on Lashkar, Jamat-ud-Dawa had 1,150 organisational offices in Pakistan out of which 74 were at the district level.

The Lashkar was officially confined to Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and Moulana Abdul Wahid Kashmiri was chosen as its new leader to give it an indigenous Kashmiri character while Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi became the Lashkar’s supreme commander. These measures, announced publicly by Sayeed, did work and with the passage of time managed to evade a complete shut down by the Pakistani government.

Pakistan’s government, however, did respond with an iron fist to Deobandi groups. While the Pakistani army has waged a war against Tehreek-e-Taliban in FATA, the military action on Lal Masjid in the heart of Islamabad last year exhibited Pakistani establishment’s total intolerance to a threat to its authority. The mosque and its two affiliate Deobandi schools were run by two brothers, Abdul Rashid Gazi and Molvi Abdul Aziz, who vehemently supported “jihad against America” and openly condemned President Musharraf for joining the ‘war on terror’ campaign. Besides, Lal Masjid was actively involved in challenging the writ of the government in Islamabad by setting up a parallel judiciary inspired by Sharia law. The Pakistan Army’s ‘Operation Silence’ ended in a bloodbath at Lal Masjid, killing hundreds of students and Ghazi.

Unlike the Lashkar, Pakistan has been strict with Jaish-e-Mohammad. Jaish is Deobandi and its members were involved in an assassination attempt against Musharraf. But even then, it’s highly unlikely that it will hand over Jaish leader Moulana Masood Azhar to New Delhi only because it will be domestically dubbed as an anti-Kashmir move.

There is another domestic reason behind Pakistan’s inability to act against Sayeed and Jamat-ud-Dawa under New Delhi’s pressure. Dawa runs a big and efficient education network of about 200 model schools, two science colleges and 11 madrasas. Its headquarters is spread across 200 acres in Muridke, 30 km from Lahore. Dawa also runs a massive charity organisation and does voluntary relief work like the post 2005 earthquake effort which drew international attention. The group also runs a network of mosques and has set up two hospitals and 60 dispensaries across Pakistan. Dawa’s organisational structure is elaborate, with exclusive departments for preaching and reform, ulema and teachers, students, education, resources, martyrs, external affairs, peasants and labour wing and public relations, besides a press-and-publication wing called the Darul Andalus. Thus apart from the Lashkar, Sayeed and his group have managed to extend their influence deep inside a big chunk of Pakistani society through its charity and preaching.

Pakistan has another practical difficulty in cracking down on the Lashkar. While the Taliban draws most of its cadre from the Frontier province, Lashkar’s men are predominantly from rural Punjab. And thus any action against Lashkar perceived to be taken under New Delhi’s pressure will have consequences in Pakistan’s biggest province and the hub of its political elite thus a big risk.

The terror module

Training

Foundation: Recruits are given ideological indoctrination in a 21-day course explaining the merits of the Salafi school of thought.

Al-Ra’d (Thunder): For the next three months, recruits who are physically fit, literate and are ready to dedicate their lives to jihad are given military training.

Guerrilla training: A six-month-long, rigorous military training programme, with special emphasis on guerilla warfare. Before training, each recruit is required to draw up his will and hand it over to the commander. Recruits may be launched after this stage.

Jindla: Only those who have already participated in militant action are allowed to join this nine-month-long programme. Recruits are taught to make weapons and ammunitions and trained in heavy weaponry.

Doshka: Recruits who have undergone guerrilla training are trained in hand-operated weapons in a seven-to-ten-day programme.

Domella: Group commanders are trained for a month in operating weapons from the shoulder.

Zakazak: A specialised course that trains recruits to operate cannons and tanks.

Objectives of Jihad

In May 1999, Lashkar-e-Toiba published a booklet, Why we do Jihad, written by Abdul Salam bin Mohammad. It listed eight objectives:

• Muslims should fight as long as a dispute persists

• It is obligatory for Muslims to fight till Allah’s kingdom is established in the world

• It is obligatory for Muslims to fight till they overthrow all infidel governments

• Wherever there is oppression, Muslims are bound to fight it

• If any infidel kills a Muslim, it is to be avenged

• If any nation breaches a contract with Muslims, it is obligatory to fight that nation

• Muslims should fight against aggression by any other nation

• If infidels encroach upon any part of a Muslim land, it is obligatory to fight them and restore it

Weapons and modus operandi

Lashkar-e-Toiba uses rifles of AK series, Kiran Kope, Kala Kope, rocket projectile guns, grenades, improvised explosive devices and machine guns. The most potent weapon is its fidayeen attack or suicide operations, which are different from other suicide militancy across the world. Since Islam prohibits suicide, Lashkar’s fidayeen do not go on missions where death is certain, but select assaults where they do have a chance, however slim, of returning alive.

Jihad mouthpieces

Jamat-ud-Dawa runs an Urdu monthly journal, Al Dawa, which has a circulation of 80,000, an Urdu weekly, Gazwa, a children’s monthly, Nanhe Mujahid, and an English monthly, Voice of Islam. Besides, there is also a multi-lingual website.