Mottaki might also recognise that even though India does not command the kind of power and influence enjoyed by China and Russia, its intentions are more transparent that the other two.

The perceived sympathy of these countries towards Iran is nothing more than a leverage to secure better deals from Washington. If the price is right, neither will not hesitate to “abstain” from any crucial vote in the Security Council. Iran can’t ignore a harsh reality: like the US, both China and Russia are opposed to Iran going nuclear.

India might also use the recent meetings with other leaders from the middle-east, especially King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait’s Emir al-Sabah, to get the point across to the Iranian visitor. Their concerns and apprehensions over the perceived Iranian hegemony is real and could not be wished away by political rhetoric.

Further, as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran will not be able to cite the Indian nuclear tests as a precedent, even in private. India might tell Mottaki that in the event of a confrontation with the international community, Tehran will not be able to count on India’s support.

In 1991, Saddam Hussein underestimated the opinion of the international community over Kuwait and Iraq paid the price. Hopefully, Ahmadinejad wil look for a better example than Saddam to emulate.

Second, India will also be keen to resolve the issue of the tri-nation gas pipeline. Despite considerable American displeasure and pressure tactics, India has been committed to the idea of strengthening energy cooperation with Iran. Until such time as the pipeline becomes a financially feasible proposition, India is prepared to increase the quantity of gas imports from Iran.

... contd.