While the nuclear deal signed with US President George W. Bush has generated an intense domestic debate since July 2005, Dr Singh’s initiative to resolve the problem of Jammu and Kashmir has not got the attention it deserves. In the end, his attempt to settle the Kashmir dispute and normalise relations with Pakistan could turn out to be far more consequential for India and the region than the nuclear deal with the US.

General Musharraf’s latest proposal on J&K — presented in an interview to an Indian TV channel — has elicited the question whether there was anything new. But the more important question is whether Musharraf’s ideas will take us down the road towards a reasonable settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

Just as the nuclear deal with the US has liberated India from being an outcaste in the global nuclear order, a settlement with Pakistan on J&K could provide the basis for a historic post-partition political reconciliation in the subcontinent. Also, as in the debate on the nuclear deal, there is the real danger that sections of the Indian establishment and the political classes might make heavy weather out of Musharraf’s proposals.

This is but natural, given the scale and scope of the political change involved in India’s nuclear policy as well as the approach to Pakistan and the dispute over J&K. Yet the prime minister has every reason to press ahead with negotiations on Kashmir. For, he recognises a simple fact that the Indian establishment tends to ignore: the final settlement of J&K dispute is in India’s interest.

As a prudent risk-taker, the PM is aware that the huge uncertainty in negotiating with Pakistan has been significantly reduced over the years, first by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who initiated the talks on Kashmir, and then by General Musharraf, who has begun to demonstrate considerable flexibility on Jammu and Kashmir.

Although Musharraf has had the tendency to shoot from the hip on Kashmir in front of television cameras in the past, his latest remarks must be assessed for their own inherent merit and timing. First, his latest proposals come in the wake of a sustained back channel negotiation on Kashmir between New Delhi and Islamabad over the last many months.

At their meeting in Havana in September Dr Singh and General Musharraf for the first time acknowledged in public that there was “progress” in the Kashmir negotiations. And that they would work to reduce the remaining “divergence” in the negotiating positions on Kashmir. Musharraf’s latest comments fit into a pattern that has emerged since he visited India in April 2005.

In their New Delhi talks, Dr Singh and General Musharraf had outlined the basic terms for a J&K solution. For Musharraf, status quo in Kashmir was not acceptable. For Dr Singh, any territorial change in J&K was unacceptable. Both of them agreed that the dividing line in Kashmir should become irrelevant.

Together these three parameters provided the terms for a final settlement on Kashmir. During his visit to Amritsar last March, the prime minister added another element — the idea of a shared institutional mechanism between the two Kashmirs to improve the human condition in the state. That, for all practical purposes, completed the new template on J&K.

Given this recent history, it would not be accurate to ascribe the entire ownership of the Kashmir initiative to General Musharraf alone. It has emerged out of a dialogue with Dr Singh starting in April 2005.

More important than political ownership is the question whether the four new ideas that have emerged from the recent Indo-Pak dialogue on Kashmir are credible and useful. Put simply, these ideas are: ‘autonomy’ or ‘self-governance’ to both sides of the J&K, open borders, a supervisory mechanism with representatives of all parts of Kashmir, India and Pakistan, and finally a progressive ‘demilitarisation’ of the entire state of J&K.

Every one of these ideas would be hotly contested, for they depart from the long stated positions of India and Pakistan on Jammu and Kashmir. But as a package, this is perhaps the best anyone has ever come up with over the last many decades. It is also one that takes into account the basic political sensitivities of India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris.

To be sure, there are many details to be filled out: an agreed definition of autonomy/ self-rule/ self-governance, ensuring symmetry of self-rule on both sides of the dividing line, the geographic scope of the J&K state to be included in the final settlement, the composition and jurisdiction of the supervisory mechanism. Equally difficult will be a mutually satisfactory arrangement that will ensure the absence of violence and terrorism and downsize the Indian and Pakistani military presence in J&K over a period of time.

But none of these problems is impossible to overcome. As Indian and Pakistani negotiators grapple with these challenges, the political classes in New Delhi and Islamabad must react with a little more empathy than before. For this is no ordinary moment between India and Pakistan. For the first time since 1962-63, India and Pakistan are in the thick of a rare and purposeful negotiation on the Kashmir question. We must all wish them luck and promise to do no harm.