Perhaps Pakistan did not realise this consequence. One does not know whether whether the minimum flow could have been maintained from some other source. (That is not a requirement under the treaty, for the simple reason that the possibility of reduced or no flows because of the absence of low-level outlets is not recognised by it.) Such a possibility ought to have been discussed in the Indus Commission. In fact, the best course would have been to have agreed at the Commission-level on the modalities of filling of the reservoir, as provided for in the treaty.

Though ominous sounding, this is unlikely to snowball into a major controversy. Though the word “reservoir” is used, we are talking not about a large “storage” but about “pondage” for the purpose of turbine operations, i.e., a fairly small storage of limited capacity (reduced still further by the NE’s recommendations to take care of Pakistan’s concerns). Filling such a small reservoir cannot take much time (perhaps a week), and the reduction of flows, if any, can only be for a very short period (perhaps only a day or two). Presumably the reservoir-filling has been completed. If so, whatever has happened is now over and cannot be undone.

It is also necessary to ensure that in the future, a way to reconcile these two inconsistent provisions in the treaty is found. The right course would surely be to provide low-level outlets.

What this new discord brings to the surface is underlying lower-riparian anxiety and insecurity about upper-riparian control. One can only hope that good sense will prevail and that the two sides will resolve the issue, either at the current meeting of the Indus Commission, or at the higher government level. But please leave the existing treaty alone.

... contd.