The Sukh Ram katha

If you looked closely at Sukh Ram’s career, you might be forgiven the impression that the law of the land, when it is upheld by the court, is a joyless partypooper. Everything was going swimmingly for the politician from Mandi, Himachal Pradesh. He rose rapidly from the first position he held as member, Territorial Council 1962-63, to MLA and minister in the state government, to MP and Union minister. Till the court struck for the first time in 1996. That was when the trial court framed charges against him on the basis of CBI investigations. The government had incurred a loss of 1.68 crore in a telecom equipment deal; the loss was on account of the minister’s decision to pay a higher price to a private manufacturer; his decision went against the recommendation of the Price Negotiation Committee. Later, during CBI raids at his houses at Mandi and Delhi, currency wads tumbled out of bedsheets, plastic bags, suitcases.

Sukh Ram was thrown out of both the Congress government and party but he quickly picked up the threads again. He floated the Himachal Vikas Congress and won the February 1998 assembly elections from Mandi with a thumping margin, bagging 64.63 per cent of the vote against 16.79 per cent secured by his nearest rival. With the Congress and BJP evenly poised, the HVC became Kingmaker. Sukh Ram joined hands with the BJP, the party that had stalled Parliament over his role in the telecom scam about two years earlier. He was de facto deputy chief minister in the BJP-HVC government. Till May 1998 when President Narayanan granted sanction to the CBI to prosecute him in another scam-related case and he had to step down from government. Now the adverse verdict by a trial court has compelled Sukh Ram to resign as HVC chief. But chances are, if the law allows Sukh Ram to contest elections again, another victory with another wholesome margin awaits Mandi’s prodigal son.

This story would not have read differently had Sukh Ram filled out an affidavit disclosing his assets, criminal cases and educational qualifications. Because the problem here is certainly not the lack of information available to the voter. Sukh Ram has been at the centre of one of the most visible cases of corruption in recent times. There are Sukh Ram jokes, one can be accused of ‘doing a Sukh Ram’.

Nor will disclosures change the election verdict for many other candidates. There are many reasons why the corrupt and the criminal get our vote. It mostly is that the menu is a severely restricted one — the voter must choose between the candidate who is corrupt and shares the spoils and one who is corrupt but does not share the spoils. By all accounts, Sukh Ram belongs to the first category. He openly subverted the checks and balances in the DoT’s purchase procedure as minister, he stuffed all his domestic spaces with public loot, but he also took good care of his constituency.

We need to think about the problem differently, perhaps. Instead of looking at the corruption and criminalisation of politics as merely an affliction of the relationship between the voter and the voted, we need to address the institutional design that mediates the relationship. We need to pay attention to the chinks that allow Sukh Ram and Co to proliferate the system and hijack it without a sense of scandal. We need to bring in a less distorted representation by throwing up a less compromised leadership.

The importance of being Sukh Ram derives largely from the fact that political finance depends almost entirely upon the ‘resourcefulness’ of individuals. Elections are prohibitively expensive, legitimate sources of funding are scarce, and there is a grossly unequal distribution of available funds. Political finance reforms are needed to reduce campaign costs and ensure more transparency in accounting. Some of this can be achieved by rationalising the ceiling on election expenditure and ensuring that returns of expenses filed by candidates and tax returns filed by parties are opened to public scrutiny. And yes, Explanation 1 to Section 77 (1) of the Representation of the People Act must go — it says expenditure by party and supporters does not count in the candidate’s election expenses. We also need to think of a system of public funding, if only a partial one, that provides all players with more equitable access to resources.

We could think about endorsing the EC’s insistence that political parties regularly conduct internal elections before they can earn the Commission’s recognition. Left to themselves, parties have resisted the institutionalisation of internal democracy. It is time perhaps for minimalist legislation that requires them to follow their own constitution, to maintain an open register of membership and conduct regular elections. Representative democracy cannot be made more substantial as long as parties are dominated by authoritarian, unrepresentative, corrupt leaderships.

The spotlight must also shift from the high arena of national politics to the intermediary and local levels. Some have argued that bringing the State Election Commissioner, who conducts elections to panchayati raj and nagarpalika institutions, under the EC, may lend the office more teeth.

It won’t be easy. There are far too many pay-offs embedded in the present system for the ruling elite. But until we acknowledge that political reform is not just about ‘managing’ the system better, until we think more deeply about correcting the distortions, till then the tug of war between parties and the court over disclosures will remain only a mildly entertaining sideshow. Next time you switch on to an earnest discussion on the Legislature versus the Judiciary, you may as well change the channel.