Early days yet

The new policy makers of the Bush administration would do well to remember that punitive restrictions against India have never worked

When George W. Bush took over as president of the United States, the general expectation was that there would be continuity in Indo-US relations. This was based on the views expressed by Bush in his election campaign and Secretary of State General Colin Powell talking about the need to give more attention to India in his testimony before the US Congress during his confirmation hearing.

Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had spoken to Bush on telephone during his visit to Washington in September. His Principal Secretary Brajesh Mishra had met Bush’s National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice. There were signals that there shall be continuity in Indo-US relations. The earthquake in Gujarat was an unexpected catalyst for testing this assumption. Bush spoke to Vajpayee immediately after the earthquake conveying sympathy and concern and assurances of relief assistance. Condoleeza Rice spoke to Mishra on the same lines.

The senior foreign and security policy appointments made so far by Bush confirmed assessments regarding continuity. Vice-President Cheney and new Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld are experienced hands in security problems, having been defence secretaries in the previous Republican administration. General Colin Powell as Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff oversaw the beginning of defence cooperation on security matters between India and the US in the 1990s. Richard Armitage, whom Bush had appointed as Deputy Secretary of State for Defence, has dealt with Asia and the Far East during the Reagan administration. Bush has not appointed an Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia to succeed Karl Inderfurth.

The month of February witnessed some critical developments in Indo-US relations. First, the US threatening imposition of trade sanctions on Indian exports to the US, if India did not remove quantitative restrictions on importing soda ash from the US. (It is not an accident that Vice-President Cheney comes form Wyoming, the largest soda ash producing state in the US).

Then the US Secretary for Defence Donald Rumsfeld, while describing Russia as a nuclear proliferator, criticised Russia for supplying nuclear reactors for power generation to countries like Libya, North Korea and India, which could constitute a security threat to the US. Rumsfeld’s clubbing India with Libya and North Korea is resented in India, and generated concern about the Bush government’s attitude. Rumsfeld’s statement was compounded by the US State Department spokesman’s statement in which he suggested that Russia should not supply uranium fuel for the Tarapur atomic power reactor. He proceeded to suggest that Russia should pull back from the contracts which it has signed with India for supplying reactors to be located in Tamil Nadu.

The fourth critical development was the US carrying out air strikes against Iraq without referring the matter to the Security Council. The US spokesman justified this action as a routine operation within the framework of the earlier Security Council resolutions. India was sharply critical of the air strikes. The Government of India considered them unnecessary and increasing the sufferings of the people of Iraq.

The question is whether Indo-US relations are again going off the rails or whether these developments are only a temporary phase. That such difficulties may arise was not unexpected. Frank Wisner, former US envoy to India, during a visit to New Delhi in January said that India and the US should be prepared to face some hiccups in bilateral relations as the new US administration settles down.
How should one react in terms of policy towards these developments. First, we must remember the mindset of the top political figures advising Bush on foreign and security policies. Cheney, Rumsfeld and Colin Powell have a mindset of the Republican administrations of the 80s and the 90s. They were participants in the US’ assertive postures against the former Soviet Union and the architects of its Middle East policies culminating in the Gulf War. Their perceptions about India and Pakistan is also rooted in their experiences of this period.

Rumsfeld’s views about Russia being a nuclear proliferator is a reaction to Russia’s opposition to the National Missile Defence which the Bush administration proposes to implement, combined with Theatre Missile Defence plans in the Far East.

While on issues like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the US may not be insistent with India because the Bush administration itself is not keen on it, it (the Bush Administration) would want India to remain under general pressure for falling in line with the global non-proliferation agenda of the US. Bush policy planners may have the assessment that while asking India to roll back its nuclear capacities may not be a practical proposition, the attempt to freeze India’s nuclear capacities could be a feasible objective. The US objecting to supplies of nuclear fuel to the Tarapur reactor is and should be a matter of serious concern for India, as it has significant economic and technological implications. There is every reason to examine the implications of these critical developments and Washington must also take note of the fact that over the last two months, Mishra has had useful discussions with Donald Rumsfeld and with Condoleeza Rice on the expansion of Indo-US relations.

The US has lifted sanctions against the supplies of spare parts for Sea King helicopters of the Indian Navy. One can hope for some practicality in the USA’s attitudes towards India, given these latter interactions. One should also wait for the full complement of South Asia Policy advisers to take position in the US government. So far Assistant and Deputy Assistant Secretaries for South Asia have not been appointed. So Rumsfeld might not have had the benefit of relevant political advice, while he had inputs from the non-proliferation hawk when he made the statement referred to.

The new policy makers of the US would also do well to remember that punitive restrictions against India have never worked. The US stopped the supply of Russian cryogenic booster engines for Indian satellites. There was a certain delay but India developed its own booster engines by the late 90s. US sanctions, post-Pokharan, created difficulties for India but they did not make any impact on India’s policies. One hopes that the Bush administration exercises its capacity for historical recall in these respects while formulating its India policy. India should remember that Clinton came to terms with India and adopted a positive attitude only during the second half of his second term. In the first five-and- a-half years of his presidency India was not even a blip on his foreign policy radar screen. There is no cause for alarm or disappointment.

India’s reactions need not be instant and reactive. Let us come to conclusions after the six-month or one-year period about President Bush’s policies towards India.

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