A more dangerous world

THE world remains bemused by US President Bush’s policy statement made in May that the US will proceed with the implementation of the National Missile Defence System (NMDS). Recent reports from Washington also have it that the Bush administration is likely to resume underground nuclear tests. The last publicly declared nuclear tests by the US were in 1993. The Clinton administration refrained from conducting nuclear tests, given its strong advocacy for the implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was negotiated between 1994 and 1997 in Geneva.

The operational aspects of the US non-proliferation agenda over the last eight years were, first, to extend the nuclear non-proliferation treaty indefinitely. Second, to put in place two additional treaties to prevent horizontal proliferation of such weapons, namely, the CTBT, and the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMOT) — CTBT stipulates a complete ban on all categories of nuclear tests, the FMOT aims at pre-emptive measures which will prohibit processes of nuclear weaponisation at their very root.

The US still remains committed to these processes but the new aspec of its security policies is not just to sustain its superior military position but acquire higher levels of military technology capabilities to ensure its long-term political and military superiority. This is the motive inherent in the reported decision of the US to possibly revive its programme of nuclear tests. A ban or long-term moratorium on nuclear testing would prevent US defence experts from checking and updating the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons. This is apart from the argument that there is no guarantee that China and Russia will not upgrade their nuclear weapons capacities and that new nuclear weapons powers, like India and Pakistan, will not further enhance their nuclear weapons capacities.

The macro-level strategic argument, not openly articulated, is that in terms of a strategic balance of power between different regions, the US has to potentially meet the ramifications of the Eurasian region having five nuclear weapons powers: Russia, China, India and Pakistan and potentially Japan. Just conducting further tests for nuclear weapons would not complete the process of acquiring decisive technological superiority. It is logical to anticipate that the US would also conduct tests to improve its strategic long-range missile capacities and delivery systems because, ultimately, the deployment of an effective theatre missile defence system and a NMDS in space would depend on rockets placing such weapons in space. These reports about the US resuming nuclear tests come after discussions between the US and top leaders of Russia, China and members of NATO. Significantly, they have not been contradicted. More importantly, the decision comes on the eve of Bush’s first official visit to China in October.

The ramifications of the US decision to revive nuclear and missile testing and to endorse similar actions by Russia and China are a matter of serious concern. The NMDS would erode the present Russian and Chinese capabilities to deter a potential nuclear attack from the US. The concept of effective deterrence will also go for a toss. This is a serious security challenge to China and Russia, for whom nuclear and missile deterrence is important. The NMDS will take some time to become operational. It is obvious that China will rapidly augment its nuclear weapons capacities. There is also every likelihood of the Russian Federation pulling back from Start-II and Start-III Agreements and taking steps to improve its weapons capacities. Indications that US may allow the Chinese and the Russians to conduct further nuclear/missile tests to assuage their threat perceptions will destroy the logic of the non-proliferation treaty even further. Non-nuclear weapons states and nuclear weapons threshold states will get more convinced about the domineering inclinations of the present nuclear weapons powers, thus germinating prospects of further horizontal proliferation.

The movement towards the NMDS would inevitably lead to demands for the deployment of anti-satellite weaponry in outer space to defend the NMDS itself which, in turn, will violate the 1967 Treaty banning weapons from outer space. The main aspects of arms control arrangements, namely, selective and calibrated disarmament, gradual de-alerting of weapons systems, prevention of horizontal proliferation and stablisation of nuclear weapons capacities of nuclear weapons powers at their present levels will qualitatively diminish in effectiveness. The long-term implications are fraught with uncertainties. An US government commission on technical assessment of the NMD project, called the Welch Report, has assessed that any rushing in to deploy the NMDS would result in technology failures and high levels of infructuous expenditure. This argument is based on the US government’s decision to reach operational deployment stage of NMD in about eight years’ time, whereas US experts have calculated that foolproof progress towards operationalisation should take 15 to 20 years.

All this has serious implications for India in terms of their impact on the regional security environment. First, it will initiate a new arms race by Russia and China. Given Chinese defence cooperation programmes with Pakistan,any improvement of Chinese capacities will increase security threats to India. Augmentation of the Chinese and Russian nuclear and missile capacities may lead to the US endorsing Japan becoming incrementally self-reliant for its defence in these specialised sectors.

Two important policy decisions taken by India now become subject to doubts in the context of the likely revival of nuclear and missiles tests by the US. India, after its nuclear weapon tests in 1998, had announced that it will not hold any further tests. It had also given indication that it will develop its missile and delivery systems, subject to some self-imposed restraints. Should India remain committed to these restraints? The second decision was to support those sections of President Bush’s National Missile Defence policy statement of May 1, in which he asserted that the objective of the NMD was to reduce the nuclear arsenals of the existing nuclear weapons powers. India’s support was a nuanced one, emphasising that this aspect of US policy had a congruence with India’s disarmament objectives. If the US resumes nuclear tests and if China and Russia follow suit these policy pronouncements of ours become irrelevant. Our nuclear missile defence planning is still in its initial stages. We must give careful consideration to their implications.

The challenge that India faces now, Post-Pokharan II, is both technological and political. Coping with it is not going to be easy.

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