The general feels the pain

ONE facet of the consequences of the US-led anti-terrorist military campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s involvement in the campaign, which has not attracted the attention it deserves, is the impact of these developments on the domestic political situation in Pakistan.

When one talks of Pakistan, one is referring primarily to the policies of the government of President General Pervez Musharraf. The main point to remember is that the terrorist attack on the US and the US’ response to it have complex implications for Pakistan in terms of political stability and cohesiveness of its civil society. One must go beyond the manifest policy orientations to comprehend as to what is happening and what is likely to happen inside Pakistan. It must be noted that Musharraf extended support to the US reluctantly and under pressure. Reluc- tantly because public opinion in his country was not supportive of any US campaign against a neighbouring Muslim country and against the charismatic movement led by Osama bin Laden.

Nearly three and half decades of incremental Islamisation of the Pakistani civil society and Pakistan’s power structure has resulted in this emotional religious mindset. Musharraf was conscious that his decision to support the US and cooperate with it would attract widespread opposition from the people of Pakistan regardless of the government claim that it is only some minority segments which were opposing his decision. The pressures which led to Pakistan joining the US campaign were two-folds: First, if he had not joined the US-led coalition, there was the possibility of the US dealing with Pakistan as a state supporting and sponsoring terrorism, especially in the context of the close linkages between Pakistani military establishment and the Taliban as well as with the Al-Qaeda. Then there was the possibility which Musharraf himself mentioned publicly that the US might have destroyed what he called ‘‘the strategic assets of Pakistan’’ viz its nuclear and missile capacity and related technological wherewithal. Thirdly, the Musharraf government was facing a critical economic situation as well as considerable shortfalls in military supplies and equipment, due to US sanctions imposed on Pakistan after the Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998.

Musharraf calculated that if he did not cooperate with the US these sanctions would continue debilitating Pakistan. And if he joined the US, it would lift the sanctions and resume various categories of assistance to Pakistan. A calculation which has been proved correct. It must also be remembered that Musharraf did not have the unqualified support of the higher command of the Pakistani armed forces in his decision to cooperate with the US. There are reports that in the meeting of the corps commanders held in the second week of September after the terrorist attacks on the US, seven out of 11 corps commanders had reservations about Pakistan extending political support to the US. There was even greater opposition to Pakistan providing logistical support and launching facilities to US forces in Pakistan and Pakistani territorial waters. It was only after Musharraf assured his senior colleagues about the revival of flows of defence supplies that they reluctantly agreed to the pro-US decision which he took.

The conclusion that Musharraf’s decision has been against profound undercurrents of opposition and doubts amongst the people and the power structure of Pakistan is inescapable. Internal developments in Pakistan over the last eight weeks confirm the validity of this conclusion. There have been massive demonstrations against Musharraf’s policy of cooperating with the US, in Quetta, Peshawar, Karachi, Rawalpindi and Lahore, led by all the Islamic parties of Pakistan. The two major political parties of Pakistan, the Muslim League and the PPP, have not given full support to Musharraf. That the Musharraf government reached levels of serious concerns about these demonstrations is proved by the fact that it has had to put the leaders of Jamat-e-Islami and other religious parties under house arrest and restrictions.

Musharraf had to fall in line with the US in freezing the assets and resources of militant Islamic groups in Pakistan, who have been listed by the US as entities involved with international terrorism. This has generated widespread resentment against Musharraf and his government. By mid-October Musharraf was concerned about possible opposition from the higher command of his armed forces. He had to take the drastic step of transferring or retiring seven out of 11 of his seniormost military colleagues who included Lt. General Aziz, who actually brought Musharraf to power in 1999 and the chief of the ISI, General Mahmood Ahmed, who had very close connections with the Taliban government. Musharraf is engaged in an extremely difficult exercise of being in the good books of the US on the one hand and, at the same time, not losing his credibility as a Pakistani ruler and leader committed to the ideology and the interests of Islam.

President Bush has not accepted many of the demands of Musharraf which have embarrassed him further and reduced his domestic political credibility. The positioning of US warships in Pakistan’s western coastal territorial waters and Musharraf’s permission to the US forces to use the air force bases at Dalbandin, Jacobabad, Pasni and Panjgur have attracted criticism from Pakistan’s strategic and security analysts. The most trenchant elements in this criticism are that Musharraf’s decisions are contrary to general public feelings and that he has not taken the people into confidence.

Since the tenure in office of General Zia-ul-Haq, the officer cadre of the Pakistan army has been incrementally Islamised. This is a critical challenge to the survival of Musharraf in power, given the fact that support from the armed forces is very important for his survival.
The US military campaign not having resulted in any decisive or tangible achievement so far has put a question mark over the logic and validity of Musharraf’s policies. The overall situation within Pakistan, therefore, is characterised by the following trends:

• Musharraf does not have the general endorsement of public opinion in Pakistan. His survival depends only on the extent to which Pakistani armed forces support him. Support from the army itself beyond certain thresholds is a matter of doubt.
  
• Pathans in the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan want to cross over to Afghanistan to join the Taliban’s fight against the US.
  
• Pakistani civil society stands dangerously polarised within itself and from the Musharraf government.
  
• There are no prospects of the emergence of any stable government in Afghanistan in the foreseeable future which will be a setback to the Pakistani interests in Afghanistan and in relation to Islamic countries in general.
  

While Musharraf may be able to control Pakistani politics with the support of the armed forces, his personal survival is open to the threat of terrorist action by militant Islamic groups within Pakistan.
One, therefore, anticipates a period of instability and political turmoil within Pakistan which, in turn, will be accompanied by heightened levels of hostility and antagonism towards India.

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