India and the US: many roads ahead

President Bush’s visit to Beijing in the first half of February should put to rest unrealistic speculations about a likely strategic consensus between China, the Russian Federation and India to counter the dominant influence of the United States in world affairs.

Bush and Jiang Zemin agreed that US and China have a shared responsibility to maintain world peace and stability, particularly in the Asian region. Expressing their views on Indo-Pakistan relations, Jiang and Bush affirmed that they would encourage India and Pakistan to enter into a dialogue and resolve the Kashmir problem which they consider a factor of continuing tension in South Asia.

Bush and Jiang affirmed the position of their countries as great powers which have a higher responsibility to keep peace in this region. This Chinese assertion (with Bush) plus Chinese equations with Pakistan should make Indian analysts desist from irrelevant and irrational exercises aimed at the much bandied about ‘strategic equation’ theory.

This assessment is also rooted in the inescapable reality that the Russian Federation needs to have good relations with the US, given its economic predicaments and security concerns.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reactions to Bush’s Strategic Defence Initiative, to US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and his acquiescence of the dominant role of western powers led by the US in Afghanistan clearly indicate that Russia is not likely to have much of a stomach for a strategic equation with India to contain the US.

It is obvious, therefore, that while sustaining a good and broad-based bilateral relationship with China and the Russian Federation, India has to continue focussing on relations with the US. The relationship with China and Russia can only be a balancing factor. It cannot be and should not be an exercise in countering the US or containing it.

It is pertinent therefore to review the basic pattern of Indo-US relations during the last year. Significant characteristics of this pattern are: The US seeking to intensify collaboration with India on the whole range of issues that currently confront the international community.

The initiatives which India took since 1992 to establish closer relations with the US, particularly those taken after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, have resulted in President Bush being convinced of the relevance of a long-term positive relationship with India.

As he said in his state of the union message in January, 2002 ‘‘the US is working with India in ways which we have never before to achieve peace and prosperity’’.

India and the US are agreed on a long-term partnership to counter terrorism and religious extremism, apart from structuring cooperative bilateral policies which have resulted in close collaboration between India and the US at the UN.

Both countries contributed to the passing of the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 against terrorism and are now jointly working for the adoption of a comprehensive convention against international terrorism of which India is one of the original sponsors.

India and US working together to turn off the tap of financial resources of the terrorists, Indian advocacies leading to the US Government designating the Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Toiba as international terrorist organisation exemplify that this cooperation is not declaratory but substantive.

This does not mean that Indian concerns on terrorism are fully met. The US is being more patient and gradualistic than India would wish in pressurising General Musharraf to pull back from supporting terrorist secessionism in Jammu and Kashmir.

This is logical from the point of view of the US which considers its partnership with the Musharraf government important in its on-going efforts at fighting terrorism in Afghanistan and stabilising the Afghan government.

The US Ambassador in New Delhi, Dr Robert Blackwill, indicated in a speech on February 26 that more than fifty American policy-makers at the Assistant Secretary level and above have visited India since July 2001.

There has been a matching number of visits by the Government of India to the US covering a wide-range of bilateral issues from trade and technology, to energy and environment.

Leaving aside Pakistan’s more active operational role in the anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan, India and the US have been active in negotiations aimed at the stabilisation and development of Afghanistan, US’s and Indian special envoys Dobbins and S.K. Lambah have been functioning in co-ordination at New York, at Bonn and Tokyo.

India’s role in stabilising the political flux in Central Asia and Afghanistan is now acknowledged.

The other spheres where bilateral relations have gained substance are those of intelligence and law enforcement-defence cooperation, including discussions and joint exercises between the armed forces of the two countries, energy security, economic cooperation and significantly, civil nuclear and space cooperation. Another field in which relations have gained momentum is that of science and medical research.

An elaboration regarding prospects of cooperation relating to energy security is relevant. While US multi-national companies are engaged in oil and gas exploration in the South Asian region, there is a geo-strategic dimension in energy security where the interests of India and the US converge.

The US imports 50% of its hydro carbons, from the Gulf. India imports 90% of its crude oil. There is an emerging Indo-US agreement on ensuring the security of the Gulf and the international sea routes carrying these resources across the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Though there is no dilution of opposition of the US to nuclear and missile proliferation, it must be noted that the Bush administration has stopped giving hortatory tutorials to India on nuclear and missile weaponisation, A parallel practical and rational development is India and the US reviving cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and space.

But there two issues on which there is a shortfall and concern. India is concerned about US’s relations with Pakistan and the lack of meaningful progress in economic cooperation and US investment in India.

Indian public opinion feels that the US should be more vigorous in bringing Musharraf in line with India’s concerns regarding his support to separatism in Kashmir.

There is also a tendency in India to peg its value judgements on Indo-US relations through negative prism of worries about US-Pak relations. This is an illogical approach. US structures its relations with Pakistan within the frame-work of its perceived interests. If this relationship affects India’s interests negatively, the solution is not to demand that the US scale down its relations with Pakistan.

We should have the strategic political capacities and flexibility to counter this negative impact on our own initiative, without making Indo-US relations an hostage to this predicament.

As far as the slow progress in economic and investment cooperation goes, the ball is entirely in India’s court. Cooperation in this sphere is not based on abstract political considerations or general goodwill. It depends on the content and efficiency of our economic policies. Unilateral demands cannot be a substitute for performance.

While Indo-US relations are on track, we must have a clear understanding of US priorities in this region. These are: eradication of terrorism and Islamic fanaticism in this region, stabilisation of Afghanistan is an important ingredient of this objective.

Secondly, ensuring durable security to the countries of the Gulf and West Asia, where US energy security interests are of paramount importance to them.

Thirdly, it is within this context that the US gives high priority of normalisation of relations between India and Pakistan and a political solution to the Kashmir issue. US would be a willing facilitator for negotiations and would be inclined to directly intervene if the prospects are of an actual nuclear confrontation between the two countries.

The US is interested in ensuring access to energy resources and markets of Central Asia, which would serve India interests also in the long-term. But the problem is the US being reluctant to encourage moderate political processes in Iran.

The macro-level US strategic objective is to sustain and encourage governments which would be supportive of USA’s ideological orientations, security and economic interests, and to establish a network of understandings with such governments.

India is an important factor in this scheme of things. The challenge to India’s foreign policy is three-fold: Sustaining and expanding Indo-US relations while there are and there would be differences of opinion on significant security and economic issues.

Secondly, to safeguard India’s strategic and technological interests vital to security and capacity for economic self-reliance, and third, and most important, while having a close relationship with the unipolar power that the US is, to maintain a balancing relationship with other centres of power in the world for the purpose of ensuring India’s freedom of foreign policy and strategic options.

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