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Tigers
don’t change stripes
LTTE
leader Prabhakaran’s April 10 press conference is a watershed
in the ongoing discussions for the restoration of normalcy in Sri
Lanka. The level and extent of international media attention confirms
this importance. Prabhakaran has followed up his press conference
by attending to another critical dimension for a possible solution
to the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict. He held detailed discussions
with the leader of the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress, Rauff Hakeem,
on April 13 and signed an agreement assuring him of the LTTE’s
support for the security and welfare of Muslims in the eastern provinces
of Trincomalee, Batticoloa and Amperai. He also promised that he
will facilitate the return of nearly 100,000 Muslims back to Jaffna.
But
some basic questions remain unanswered. Is Prabhakaran willing to
allow the Sri Lankan government to retain jurisdiction over defence
and foreign affairs, affecting the proposed Tamil homeland? To what
extent is the Sri Lankan government willing to delegate financial
powers and authority to maintain law and order to the proposed Tamil
government in the northeastern provinces? Is the establishment of
the interim government in the northeast considered a first step
by Prabhakaran towards an independent Tamil state in the Tamil areas
of Sri Lanka?
The
return of normalcy and stability in Sri Lanka is of deep interest
to India, in terms of both India’s security and internal unity
(in the context of the emotional links between Tamil citizens of
India in Tamil Nadu and the Tamils in Sri Lanka). It would be relevant
to analyse the motivations and the negotiating stance of Prabhakaran
before one refers to Indian reactions.
His
press conference was clearly aimed at gaining legitimacy as a political
leader — that is, countering international perceptions regarding
him and his organisation as terrorist forces. Secondly, he wished
to utilise the press conference to convey the general terms of reference
of his negotiating stance if and when bilateral discussions start
between him and the Sri Lankan government in Thailand.
Points
made by him during the press conference have been widely reported
and need no repetition. But the orientation of his policies merit
attention. First and foremost, he has made the LTTE’s participation
in the negotiations with the Sri Lankan government in Thailand conditional
to the government lifting the ban on the LTTE. He also stated he
would not personally participate in these talks. He has not resiled
from his demand for Eelam, an independent state in Sri Lanka. He
has demanded the right of self-determination and delegation of power
to Sri Lankan Tamils and implied that the establishment of an interim
government for the northern and eastern provinces would be a first
step towards achieving his Eelam. While confirming his adherence
to a ceasefire he has not agreed to give up arms or the armed struggle.
He made the curious suggestion that India should resume an active
role in finding a solution to Sri Lanka’s ethnic problem. He
was detached about Rajiv Gandhi’s death and obfuscatory about
his role in it. His political stance, as articulated by his advisor
Balasingham, is that he is negotiating with Prime Minister Ranil
Wickramasinghe not as a leader of a militant secessionist group
but as a de facto political leader. Balasingham said Prabhakaran
is both prime minister and president of Eelam. The overall conclusion
one reaches is that there is no basic change in the substantive
negotiating position of the LTTE since it pulled back from the Indo-Sri
Lankan agreement of July 1987.
Wickramasinghe’s
reaction has been conciliatory and he’s welcomed Prabhakaran’s
remarks as encouraging and positive. The Indian government has announced
a three-point policy. India would be supportive of the negotiations
and the peace process; it will not mediate or play any direct role
in these negotiations; and it has no intention of lifting the ban
on the LTTE or ignoring the indictment of Prabhakaran as the leading
figure in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination conspiracy.
What
then should the Indian approach be towards the emerging negotiations
scenario? India must welcome any peaceful initiative or process
which can lead to a rational and just solution to the ethnic problem
of Sri Lanka. While safeguarding Sri Lankan unity and recognising
the legitimate aspirations of Sri Lankan Tamils, such a process
should not legitimise terrorism and leaders of terrorist groups.
In
this context, the ceasefire brokered between the LTTE and the Sri
Lankan government by the Norwegian authorities is a positive development
which could be the first step towards negotiations between the Tamils
and the Sri Lankan government to find a solution to the ethnic problem.
India must keep in mind the fact that regardless of what Prabhakaran
said in his press interview, there is no indication from his side
that he will dilute his demand for Eelam. Equally, there is no signal
from the Sri Lankan government that they would fulfil the basic
demands of the Tamils regarding the merger of the northern and eastern
provinces as a Tamil homeland, nor are there any clear indications
about devolution of power to the proposed Tamil provincial authority.
These are extremely thorny problems.
We
should, therefore, remain watchful. Neither the Sri Lankan government
nor the LTTE has been able to evolve and agree upon a solution better
than the one Rajiv Gandhi negotiated in 1987.
Prabhakaran’s
attempt to legitimise his political status and to have the ban on
the LTTE lifted cannot obfuscate the fact that the LTTE is a terrorist
organisation, and Prabhakaran the architect of its violent policies.
The LTTE is designated as a terrorist organisation by various governments.
It is banned in India. Prabhakaran is a proclaimed offender in India,
responsible for the assassination of a former prime minister who
genuinely tried to find a practical and just solution to Sri Lanka’s
ethnic problems.
Whatever
the expectations may be from the proposed negotiations between the
LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, our national experience over
the last two decades has been that neither the Sri Lankan government
nor the LTTE is willing to work purposefully towards mutually acceptable
compromises. Nor is there any guarantee that Prabhakaran would keep
to his commitments given his history of reneging on promises. India
must therefore view the forthcoming negotiations with caution and
limited optimism.
It
is a matter of disappointment that the Vajpayee government has not
been in touch with moderate Tamil political forces in Sri Lanka,
enabling them to become a more active and effective factor in the
forthcoming negotiations. Nor has the government, despite having
discussions with the Sri Lankan prime minister, been able to suggest
that Colombo show unambiguous responsiveness to Tamil aspirations,
if it really is hopeful of successful peace talks.
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