The Oval office and the Kremlin

India hopes the US and Russia will reach an understanding on the missile defence shield as well as other international issues, so that it need not even have to attempt any artificial, post-Cold War choices, says Jyoti Malhotra.

Watching the Russian-made Sukhoi-MKI (the ‘I’ stands for India) fighter jet falling deliberately out of the sky like a wayward leaf in autumn, at an airfield on the outskirts of Moscow last week, External Affairs-Defence minister Jaswant Singh remarked, ‘‘It behaves like a well-trained horse.’’

The remark brought on the applause at the lunch later thrown for the Indian visitor, and probably became the perfect excuse for repeated and lengthy toasts of vodka between morsels of food. At first, Singh stood up in deference to his hosts, each time a toast was called. Then, as the grain-water continued to flow, he remained seated. Later, he simply left, having to catch up on his many other high-level meetings in the Russian capital.

The contrast between Singh’s earlier wonderment — at the Sukhoi’s impressive manoeuvres — and his latterly impatience at lunch, perfectly encapsulates India’s current relationship with Russia. New Delhi knows, and Tuesday’s joint state-of-the-art supersonic Cruise missile test in Orissa is proof, that despite a considerably weakened Russia at the end of a decade after the Cold War, Moscow is indispensable on the defence front. But the pertinent question remains, how does this belief square with New Delhi’s recent and very overt honeymoon with Washington?

Principal Secretary and National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra is going to the US, on the invitation of his counterpart Condoleezza Rice, at the end of June. Jaswant Singh was there in early April, to a right royal reception at the Pentagon, the State Department and even the White House. It is said that George W. Bush, the 53rd President of the US, while chatting with Singh in the Oval Office, got up from his chair, took him by the elbow, and said, ‘‘Let us walk into the Rose Garden, Jaswant, and smell the spring air.’’ They stepped out, together, into a vision of cherry-blossoms that would have been the envy of a Japanese haiku poet.

Now, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, even with the historical weight of the Kremlin by his side, cannot expect to match the sheer power exuded by the White House. For a start, he is said to speak little English. Even if he managed to get by with some American, the brute reality is that the elites of both India and Russia would give their eyeteeth for a one-way ticket to the US. Since the said condition is far more pronounced in India, it might be time to do away with the enduring hypocrisy that makes us overly critical of America.

The point is, far more Indians have probably heard of a town called St. Petersburg in the state of Florida, than the much older city of the Tsars, the Bolshevik Revolution and the World War II blockade that hugs the bank of the Neva. Crudely stated, New Delhi gave its heart away a long, long time ago to America, but it needed an ideologically right-wing party like the BJP to acknowledge the depth of India’s collective need of the US. From economic investment to school admissions to jobs — and now, to a meeting of minds on the ballistic missile system — the US and none other is the dominant foreign power in India.

Certainly, the romance of history cannot compare with contemporary strength. But what price national interest? Reports in the wake of Jaswant Singh’s trip to Moscow indicate that Russia has promised to help create a ‘‘second-strike nuclear capability’’ for India. Analysts say that even if the Bush administration lifts economic sanctions against New Delhi, imposed after the nuclear tests, it is highly unlikely to allow the free flow of sensitive technology to Indian scientific establishments.

On the other hand, what the Americans can offer in terms of economic investment, jobs or trade, cannot even begin to compare with any other nation in the world. Analysts point out that India ‘‘has no option’’ but to build a relationship with the only superpower. Unlike Europe, which can afford to be critical of Washington’s disenchantment with the Kyoto Protocol or even its much-vaunted missile shield, India, the analysts add, is too much of a bit player for its disagreements to really matter.

Which is why New Delhi will watch the Slovenian summit between Bush and Putin on June 16 with keen interest. Though Moscow has made known its displeasure about the abrogation of the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty, it could settle for a much larger engagement with the US. Bluntly put, Russia seems to be ready to negotiate a deal with the US that would include, a far greater role in world affairs (such as in the Middle East), much more economic aid and investment within Russia than has happened so far, as well as a substantially enhanced stake in dealing with issues such as drugs-trafficking, organised crime, etc.

‘‘It is in India’s interest if Russia cuts a deal with the US,’’ analysts said in Delhi, pointing out that if that did not happen, it would push Russia and China into each other’s arms. Significantly, a team of officials from the MEA is leaving for ‘‘strategic stability’’ talks in Moscow three days after Putin speaks to Bush in Ljubljana, Slovenia.

Interestingly enough, Jaswant Singh’s visit to Moscow and the promise of enormously enhanced defence cooperation between the two sides — including, the production of a fifth-generation aircraft, joint research projects with defence and civilian spin offs such as the ‘Brahmos’ project, direct sourcing of spares from manufacturers as well as package deal purchases for the Army, Navy and Air Force — seems to have only increased the internal tension in New Delhi’s foreign policy.

The next year or so, analysts say, will be crucial. As world powers decide new alignments, India will also have to make up its own mind. The easy part would be to return to a you-against-me Cold War mindset, the challenge to develop multiple relationships with all key players. In the great churning that ensues, ideological predilections in favour of one country or another — the US or Russia — could well be washed away in a typhoon of pragmatism. The Rose Garden and the Kremlin could be New Delhi’s new desire.

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