Bellicosity doesn’t pay

It is better that a settlement comes when the BJP is in power. Under any other regime, the BJP will interpret any concession on Kashmir as ‘anti-national’

A gesture, by definition, is a rough means of communication. Words are absent but the import of the message is clear. It is like a tide which taken at the right time leads on to the future. India made such a gesture which Pakistan failed to reciprocate.

Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee said in Parliament the other day that the complexion of rule in Pakistan did not matter and that India was willing to hold talks with it, provided Pakistan stopped cross-border militancy. He even corrected his minister of state for Foreign Affairs, Ajit Panja, who had told a member in the Rajya Sabha that New Delhi would have no dialogue with Pakistan so long as democracy was not restored there. Vajpayee said while he would like democracy to prevail all over the world, the fact that Pakistan was ruled by a military dictatorship would not bar his government having talks with it.

This was a big concession and it provided an opening for Pakistan Chief Executive Pervez Musharraf. Vajpayee recognised him as the rightful ruler with whom India could sit across even though he had overthrown the elected government of Nawaz Sharif. In a way, this message withdrew the earlier objections New Delhi had raised against Pakistan in the Commonwealth and other international fora, that a military dictatorship did not qualify for a discussion.

Pakistan should have gone to town with Vajpayee’s statement to tell the world that even India had come round and accepted its military rulers. It would have helped Islamabad retrieve some credibility in the eyes of the democratic world. Instead, both President Tarar and Musharraf himself reiterated in their Independence Day speeches that they would continue their ‘diplomatic’ support to the militants, ‘diplomatic’ being a mere euphemism for support with money and weapons of destruction. Musharraf’s speech at the UN was no better, neither in tone, nor in tenor. But then this is how the military in Pakistan has been thinking all along. Even when it went back to the barracks, it enunciated the policy of confrontation. It looks as if Pakistan seriously believes that India will disintegrate if pressure is maintained. Even when there has been an outside chance for peace, the Pakistan military has spoilt it through strong-arm methods.

It is not difficult to guess that Pakistan’s proxy war is costing India heavily. But it is making the security forces in Jammu and Kashmir more indiscriminate and brutal. The reason why they are given a free hand is the general belief that they are defending India’s frontiers. Islamabad is wrong if it thinks that New Delhi’s stamina is running out. If the violence of the Kargil scale did not deter India, a killing here or a bomb blast there would not frighten it. New Delhi’s forbearance has, in fact, won it international sympathy. Big powers have come to appreciate its control. What Islamabad has lost in the bargain is its image as a responsible government. The more Delhi says that it will not hold negotiations with Islamabad until it stops cross-border terrorism, the more blatant is the Pakistan government in fanning it. There has been no let up in the infiltration of jehadis or foreigners from Pakistan into Jammu and Kashmir for the last 11 years.

Lately, Islamabad has also intensified firing on the Line of Control, which was relatively quiet for some weeks. Pakistan has spoilt its own case. At one time there was a lot of international pressure on India to have talks. But, after the killing of Sikhs and pilgrims in the Valley, there is not even a remote suggestion being made to India to dialogue with Pakistan. The Musharraf government should realise that it stands isolated today. By pursuing the same old track, it is only distancing itself further from the comity of nations. Washington, too, thinks the same way. It is another matter that its distorted approach makes it believe that it should stay quiet to have leverage with Pakistan. In the name of balance of power, it has shut its eyes to the reality of terrorism.

The fact is that unless America or, for that matter, the entire world uses all its influence to stop Pakistan from assisting terrorists, the situation in the region can get out of hand. Public opinion in India is getting restive. At a popular TV show from New Delhi, 95 per cent of the audience wanted to cut off relations with Pakistan. The Hurriyat leaders can play an important role. The influence they have over the militants should be used to stop them from indulging in violence. The Hurriyat can also probably persuade Islamabad to stop cross-border militancy. What all those concerned with India-Pakistan relations must realise is that Kashmir, or any other problem, cannot be discussed seriously when guns are booming.

It is, however, a pity that whenever the Hurriyat leaders visit Delhi, they spend most of their time with the Pakistan high commissioner. They do not seem to realise that their main focus should be India. They should go to different parts of India and place before the people their point of view. Pakistan’s high commissioner is important, true. But his role at present is very limited. No one can ignore Islamabad. Even the Simla agreement emphasises that both India and Pakistan discuss ‘the final solution’ of the Kashmir issue. The question is how to go about it. Both the Hurriyat and Islamabad do not seem to realise that the ground has to be prepared for talks. This is not possible in the face of their adamant attitude. The Hurriyat insists on a tripartite conference rightaway.

Pakistan is going over the same exercise, again and again, of insisting on official channels for any proposal for a thaw. The distinction between Track One diplomacy and Track Two is that the first is official and the second, unofficial. The second has a chance of achieving fruition if the first withdraws into the background for the time being. And it is better that a settlement comes when the BJP-led government is in power. The Hindutva elements will feel pacified. In any other regime, they will interpret any concession on Kashmir as ‘‘anti-national’’ and create hell. At the same time, Musharraf is still in command in Pakistan. He may be a lesser person after a while, when Pakistan slips deeper into an economic crisis. The pressure of politicians in Pakistan is also beginning to build up and this may restrict his options.

The proposal for a tripartite conference, however attractive, is too early. There is as yet no equation between New Delhi and Srinagar or between New Delhi and Islamabad. The whole effort will go to pieces on the very first day. All the three must have some basic understanding before sitting across the same table. People other than officials should come forward to build the climate for talks. This necessitates the cessation of hostilities on all fronts. At one time, Islamabad did not seem averse to a ceasefire. Now it looks as if Musharraf wants to wait for the outcome of his visit to America.

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