A nip of irritation in the air

My guess is that Jaswant Singh will meet Abdul Sattar and pave the way for a summit after some reasonable homework has been done

Should Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee have succumbed to international pressure and agreed to meet General Pervez Musharraf in New York? I thought Vajpayee got out of it rather elegantly. He said he did not have to travel all the way to New York to meet someone resident in the neighbourhood.

The sad events of September 11 had evoked a knee-jerk response in New Delhi: terrorism, sourced to the Talibanised turf which extends from Afghanistan to Pakistan, had made such a dramatic appearance in New York and Washington that we thought our ten-year-old lamentation about ‘‘crossborder terrorism’’ would finally invite international condemnation.

But a stunned US conceived its attack on terrorism in stages. In the earlier phases of this operation against terror, Islamabad was identified, much to New Delhi’s chagrin, as a frontline state. New Delhi found this abrupt status reversal quite disconcerting.

The scale on which India and Pakistan stood in Washington’s framework prior to September 11 was exemplified by President Clinton’s itinerary last year: four days
in India and a couple of hours in Pakistan.

Against that evolving backdrop, the fact of New Delhi and Islamabad being yoked together once again like a pair of bullocks has created an unseemly image: Tony Blair, Colin Powell, Gerhard Schroeder and a host of others have rationed out their attention almost equitably between Islamabad and New Delhi. It says something of New Delhi’s priorities that not too much public notice was taken of the one who made India his only destination: Mohsin Aminzadeh, one of President Khatami’s close advisers and Iran’s deputy foreign minister.

Some serious students of Pakistan have given me the following appraisal. President Musharraf was living in the uncomfortable knowledge that extremist elements, who had penetrated all wings of the establishment, were going to make governance extremely difficult. He, therefore, converted the pressure from the Americans into an opportunity.

Protected by a total American commitment, he would witness the elimination of unmanageable ‘‘extremists’’ in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan. The Americans recognise that Pakistan has taken a huge risk in turning upon the Taliban, who had deep links with the ISI and other elements in the power structure.

The Americans thought it was prudent not to expose Pakistan’s other great vulnerability — its promotion of terrorism in Kashmir. That problem would be addressed but only in the next few phases of the campaign after they have successfully shepherded Musharraf through his current baptism by fire.

The pressure on India to talk to Musharraf was with a simple purpose: to keep the two nuclear armed states from complicating the military situation and to give Musharraf the sops that would enable him to come on top in his current campaign against extremists. New Delhi, in other words, was being asked not to press its ‘‘terrorism’’ concerns. It is precisely this situation that allows Musharraf to shoot his darts at India.

Meanwhile, in India, the post-Agra scenario has become more complicated. Supporters of the Vajpayee government are miffed over Musharraf strutting about the TV screen, scoring points over somebody the establishment has known as the ultimate in oratorical skills for the past five decades. A country short of heroes stoutly resists spotting decline in the leaders it reveres.

Although Vajpayee is committed to Indo-Pak friendship, there’s a post-Agra irritation with Musharraf that is in the air. BJP itself is torn between its internal and external priorities. On the one hand, there are those concerned about the nation’s image as a responsible player at a historic moment in international affairs; on the other, are those concerned with the party’s fortunes prior to the all-important elections in UP.

In the external arena, my guess is that Jaswant Singh will meet Abdul Sattar and pave the way for a summit after some reasonable homework has been done — the lack of which was felt at Agra. By that time we will have a better idea of what USA has in store for Musharraf.

There is a peculiar convergence of views between the doves and the hawks, vis-a-vis Musharraf. Such has been the atmospherics since Agra, that they both mistrust him.‘‘How can one trust a man who has let down his own creation, the Taliban?’’ says a senior leader. ‘‘One can understand that he is in difficulties and one would be willing to extend a helping hand, but only if he can shut up on issues that divide the two countries.’’

Those who believe the party’s fortunes will be boosted by a hard line on Pakistan must realise that they will have to sustain their shrill, parochial line for the next six months, when the elections in UP are due. The question is: will the international community stand for this?

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