Bush is no honest broker

THE foreign policy of the United States can be summed up with two icons — Lady Justice and Lady Liberty. The first is the blindfolded woman with the scales. I am not sure why this Gandhari act deserves kudos. What is so admirable in deliberately ignoring the blatant, sitting like Pontius Pilate in judgment over Jesus and Barrabas, pretending that both were equal?

As for ‘Liberty Enlightening The World’, it is a complete con-job. Bartholdi originally conceived the copper-clad giantess as a monument for the French-built Suez Canal. Then the French empire went bust, and the sculptor quickly sold the concept as a gift from France to the United States.

The two statues are perfect metaphors for a campaign that began as ‘Infinite Justice’ before being hastily renamed ‘Enduring Freedom’. It appears to be blind as well as misconceived. These, pardon me, are poor qualifications to preach to India. It is no secret that President Bush shall tout the virtues of restraint when Prime Minister Vajpayee visits him. That is fine in principle, but the grating on the ear owes more to hypocrisy than to any Texan twang. When 5,000 Americans are killed, morality demands the bombardment of Afghanistan for committing the sin of harbouring Osama bin Laden. But when Pakistan’s pet murderers are responsible for killing up to 70,000, India must turn the other cheek.

This witless pretence to morality would be sniggered at in a junior school debate; it wouldn’t take a minute for the congenitally anti-American — and India has more than its fair share — to cut such arguments to pieces. It may help all concerned if the American president stopped giving a bad imitation of a used-car salesman, and offered the real reasons why he wants Delhi to treat Musharraf with kid gloves.

The United States’ true reason for tilting toward Musharraf is that it trusts nobody else in Pakistan (a country essential to a war against Afghanistan). Musharraf is no Harishchandra, but he painted himself into a corner the moment he promised to back the American war on Afghanistan. If the United States now falters, the poor man shall probably share the fate of Najibullah (another puppet who put his fate in a super-power’s hands).

This does not mean the Americans trust Pakistan per se. They suspect that the ISI continues to provide the Taliban with information and guidance. (And, probably, with more substantial goods and services.) The change of guard — Musharraf replaced the old, pro-Taliban chief with a more pliable tool — has brought no dividends. The Pentagon continues to grouse about the lack of real-time intelligence, and 400 Pakistanis, serving or former officers, are fighting alongside the Taliban. Most important, the United States has already lost the battle for the hearts and minds of the average Pakistani. Musharraf and his set are all that keep Pakistan on the American side.

That explains why the United States doesn’t want India to rock the boat. The Pakistani dictator might survive being dubbed an American stooge, but he wouldn’t last very long if he were seen knuckling to India.

I applaud the American campaign on the grounds that they are killing terrorists who would otherwise be busy in Jammu & Kashmir. (I hope our Leftists noticed Mullah Omar has named the United States, Russia, Israel, and India as his chief foes.) Yet the argument about not rocking the boat does not, at the risk of mixing metaphors, hold much water. Why should India care overmuch for America’s conduct of its half-baked war in Afghanistan?

To this, and we approach the crux of the matter, the American response is that Musharraf is probably India’s best bet too. The alternative, they say, is a Talibanised regime in Islamabad.
It is, to Indian ears, a familiar argument, and not a particularly convincing one. Did India’s restraint help when Ayub Khan was replaced by Yahya Khan? What were the peace dividends when Bhutto was replaced by Zia? How did it help when India practised restraint during the Kargil conflict, nobly resolving not to cross the international frontier or the Line of Control? Any momentary applause died out when other considerations came into play.

However, I agree with the American thesis that we are staring into the abyss. A Musharraf who sneaks his men into Kargil is preferable to a nutcase like Mullah Omar who wants to initiate a jihad against civilisation itself, much as a thief is better than a murderer.

But, and this is important, this is a conclusion that India must make for herself. The United States understands Musharraf cannot be seen bowing to Indian pressure. Well, no Indian prime minister can be seen capitulating to American insistence on a particular course of action.
The United States is not generally regarded as an honest broker in India. It is seen as the power that provides Pakistan with arms and money. The military supplies will almost certainly be used against India. The dollars are no chastisement for a country that has consistently fostered terrorism. Colin Powell’s ham-handed attempts to broker a settlement simply evoke memories of a previous Republican administration’s infamous ‘‘tilt toward Pakistan’’ in 1971.

I agree with the basic premise that Musharraf’s shabby regime is about as good as anything that India can expect from Pakistan. Nor will national honour be diminished if the prime minister throws a bone to the general in New York. But none of this is possible if the United States makes a song and dance about it!

If the Americans want tempers cooled in South Asia, they must muzzle their poodle in Islamabad. Striving for peace is always an honourable pursuit, but not at the cost of accepting Musharraf’s gibes. This is the paradox confronting India: don’t oppose Musharraf while he opposes the Taliban, but don’t support him while he backs militancy in Kashmir (and elsewhere).

American diplomats are assiduously wooing dictatorships across Asia for their ‘coalition against terrorism’. In the next breath, they ask Israel and India — thriving democracies — to be patient. What are the freedoms for which the United States is fighting, and where is the justice in all this?

The bottomline? Talk to Musharraf by all means, but don’t do it just because the United States asks us to do so.

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