Old threat, new faces

Under Indian dissuasive strategy Pakistan has, most reluctantly and temporarily, arrested Masood Azhar, the head of Jaish-e-Mohammed, and now the head of Lashkar-e-Toiba. These are the two jehadi-terrorist organisations that have been engaged in cross-border terrorism in India and have been responsible for the attacks of October 1 and December 13. The US, which had banned both these groups, has confirmed that Pakistan has also arrested 50 top terrorists. Theoretically at least this would start to reduce Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism. But we need to keep an eye on numerous developments that are likely to shape future events.

Looking ahead to the middle of the new year, elections in Pakistan will be a major event. Elections in Jammu and Kashmir are likely to precede these. General Musharraf has already invited the exiled former prime minister Benazir Bhutto (who visited India recently and said all the right things which even provoked many in Pakistan to accuse her of treason) for a meeting in Pakistan, whether under US pressure or as part of his pragmatic strategy. It is too early to suggest that Bhutto’s return to power is being signalled. But even if that were to take place, the army on one side and General Musharraf as president on the other would continue to hold real power. Pakistan’s massive external debt has been rescheduled by the Paris Club, coincidentally on the day Parliament was attacked by fidayeen terrorists. Over two-thirds of the $12.5 billion bilateral debt has been rescheduled and this implies a more confident Pakistan on one side, greater stake in closer relations with Pakistan by the US and its allies and Pakistan’s continuing dependence on the West on the other.

At the same time, the consequences of the US-led international war against terrorism in Afghanistan need notice. The Taliban have been dismantled and replaced by a new government backed by the UN, a multinational force and the promise of substantive economic and reconstruction assistance. The key international Islamist terrorist network, Al-Qaeda, has been dispersed. In both cases the leadership has neither been captured nor confirmed as killed. It would be easy to conclude that with a global search for thousands of terrorist cadres of the Al-Qaeda and the financial squeeze on their operations, they are on the run, disorganised, and will soon start becoming irrelevant. But the United States does not believe so and plans to physically keep up the war against them with troops deployed in Pakistan (essentially west of the Indus river) for a long time to come.

However, the most likely scenario is the possibility of at least the Afghan/Pushtun and Pakistani components (which was the majority) of the Al-Qaeda slipping into and through the rugged northwest frontier of Pakistan and thence ingressing into Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir and on across the Line of Control. The existing Pakistani jehadi groups may be under pressure. But if we go by the past record of the ISI recreating jehadi groups under different names but with the same aims and objectives, it is clear that this phenomenon would continue. In fact, terrorism from the region cannot be eliminated without reforms in the ISI and the army of Pakistan. There are few signs of that. What is happening is the dispersal of the soldiers of religious extreme rather than the winding down of the ideological and operational command and control core.

Thus what we may see is a duality in developments related to cross-border terrorism in India. At one level pressures and steps by Pakistan against terrorist groups like the Jaish and LeT may now continue. At another the Al-Qaeda is increasingly likely to strengthen the terrorist cadres in Pakistan and PoK by coalescing with parts of existing sub-groups and individuals. The process may take some weeks and meanwhile it may be prudent for the jehadi terrorists to lie low to strengthen the belief that Pakistani terrorism is being rolled back under Indian and global pressure. Unless a rogue group decides to launch a spectacular strike, we may not see a major terrorist attack during the winter months. The real challenge would come by the beginning of summer when the political processes of democratic change of government in Jammu and Kashmir would start getting into higher gear. In a way this was the advance notice of the October 1 and December 13 attacks which were against democratic institutions per se.

The difference in future would be that Pakistan would claim much greater deniability with regard to terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and hence make it more difficult to deal with the threat. General Musharraf has been at pains to make a distinction between terrorism and jehad; and he had repeatedly affirmed that one of his four reasons for cooperating with the US was Kashmir. The gross numbers of terrorists may reduce because of the difficulties of sustaining a larger force. But the viciousness of attacks would increase rather than reduce. We need to be vigilant about our war against terrorism shifting to one dominated by the Al-Qaeda dispersed from Afghanistan and ingressed into Kashmir. In fact, the most favourable location for the Al-Qaeda to regroup would be the tribal areas of Pakistan and PoK. From now on it would be Al-Qaeda that we will be fighting against, regardless of the name bestowed on the outfits. This would make it necessary for a substantively intensified counter-terrorism cooperation between the US and India, especially in surveillance and intelligence information on the Al-Qaeda.

In this context two points merit attention. As de-escalation of military deployments on the India-Pakistan border starts, we need to substantively relocate and strengthen the military presence in Jammu and Kashmir (possibly by two-four divisions) to ensure peace well before the electoral process is to begin rather than in response to intensification of infiltration and acts of terrorism in early summer. Secondly, we need to pursue a concurrent policy of intensive diplomatic persuasion of the international community on the subject of the implications of international terrorism, the war against it and its consequences. At the same time, since Kashmir is likely to be on the agenda again, launching a diplomatic campaign to inform world leaders of the realities, past and present, and building a space for future dialogue and peaceful resolution of the issue with Pakistan would be necessary.

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