The test will be in summer

THE terrorist attacks of October 1 and December 13 were not only a major escalation in defiance of the global war against terrorism but they were also an attempt to force segregation of our battle against terrorism from the international war.

Our response with the threat of war, accompanied by military deployment on battle-ready positions, had people worried not only in Pakistan, but also in the US and the world, forcing them to apply additional pressure on Pakistan. Washington’s top leaders were on line to Islamabad and New Delhi more often than perhaps in the whole year earlier.

Undoubtedly our politico-military posture expedited the change and General Pervez Musharraf’s January 12 speech was apparently the result. The new directions he charted out for Pakistan against militant jehad and the culture that it had spawned in his country and abroad were welcome, even if they were mostly limited to domestic terrorism, since that would also undercut terrorism perpetuated by the jehad machine across the borders.

Fundamentally, he sought to de-legitimise terror in the name of Islam; something the previous military ruler, General Zia ul-Haq, and the army had promoted since the late 1970s. Pakistan has gained from co-operation in the current international war against terrorism; and this strengthened Musharraf’s hands. And its dependence on the international community for the coming years will influence its policies.

The question that arises now is that seven weeks into battle-ready military deployment, what next? Some gains have been made as evidenced in Musharraf’s policy reversal. But doubts have been increasingly rising whether further gains from this posture are possible? Or why carry on with the deployment if there is going to be no war? Or if war breaks out, and since it would have to be a limited war, how can we achieve decisive results?

The decisive results are not in relation to the capture of territory or destruction of Pakistani military power, but to make them change policy through attrition and the increased cost that they will have to bear.

But all these must start with the basic question: why have we deployed the military in the first place? This appears to be unprecedented although the deployment during the nine months in 1971 was unique in its own way — we were on battle-ready stations for months through the summer and on into winter.

Nehru’s India deployed its forces including the armoured Division on the borders in July 1951 in response to threats of war from Pakistan. But that was in a defensive strategy to deter a war by Pakistan to derail the J&K Constituent Assembly task of framing a Constitution.

In 1971 it did not coerce General Yahya Khan, who escalated by launching a full-fledged war only to lose it. But in 1951, coercion succeeded without war and the forces went back to barracks pretty soon.

The military power of a state is essentially meant to serve political goals. It is also the ultimate instrument available and must therefore be employed with great care and in pursuance of those aims. This is why war was defined as an extension of politics by other means. Its use for coercive power to alter the behaviour of another leadership has historically been used, no doubt more effectively by naval forces through ‘‘gunboat diplomacy’’ till combat air power strengthened the coercive instruments of military power.

But war itself comes in different shades and accordingly influences the way military power is used to deter and/or coerce the adversary. The political goals in the current military posture are not, cannot be, and should not be, to initiate a war, at least not till it becomes inevitable after all other options have been exhausted.

War through terrorism is another kind of war which must be fought politically; but military power provides the muscle and substance to political and diplomatic moves. Such a war through terror has been imposed on us by the Pakistani leadership for 17 long, tragic years.

Our current strategy should be seen as an asymmetric response to that war and more productive under the given situation, especially since the other way would have been to respond in like fashion. The international war against terrorism has provided a window of opportunity to apply political-cum-military pressure; and this window will remain as long as the international coalition led by the US continues the global war.

The obvious political aim of the current military posture has been to coerce Islamabad into altering its policy of cross-border terrorism. But any indication that we will not go to war actually undermines the very logic of coercion with a mobilised military power. In fact the utility of coercive diplomacy lies in keeping the political-diplomatic (and even economic) offensive up front while maintaining readiness to go war as a last resort, either if the adversary escalates, or if desirable results are not forthcoming.

This does not mean that war is inevitable. Much would depend upon how Pakistan acts and how the situation on the ground shapes up in future. Talk of military withdrawal is meaningless unless terrorism starts to decline noticeably. Musharraf’s proposal to de-escalate through military withdrawal was aimed at weakening the resolve in India to continue the pressures.

The record for January hardly supports any optimism for a near term de-escalation. The number of violent incidents is marginally less this January than for the same period last year. But deaths due to terrorist violence was one and a half times that of January 2001. The positive side is that the number of terrorists killed doubled, no doubt as a consequence of the more dense deployment of the military and active counter-terrorism policy. But this is winter. The test will really come during summer.

Historically coercion through military power has proved its utility in an overwhelming number of cases provided it is sustained and the coerced power makes durable changes in policy. Our option on the policy is fairly clear: military deployment to operational locations should continue, the posture that war remains an option at a time and place of our choosing, but lowering of the high alert status could slowly start in ways that ensure it can be reversed quickly.

This should be done unilaterally and the defence services know how best to relax while on guard. If Pakistan is serious about stopping militant jehad as Musharraf has promised, its army should work to stop infiltration at the borders. If one Division could prove useful on its western border, surely nearly 18 Divisions on the India-Pakistan border (besides the 20-plus Indian Divisions) should squeeze the terrorists and cut their lifeline. Provided, of course, General Musharraf co-operates!

Earlier Columns