Arms and the world

The agreement to procure the $146 million Fire Finder system, the largest arms purchase deal with the US for a long time, signifies the distance covered by both countries in coming closer in a sensitive area. Seen beyond the specific deal this implies the potential of opening up access to the American defence industry that is bound to be a critical factor in future self-reliance policies. This constitutes a significant avenue for diversification leading to self-reliance. But we need to revert to the triad of imports, licence production and indigenous design and development. The last two require collaborative programmes.

Our weapons’ procurement in the past four decades had settled down into a comfortable pattern where, in the absence of US sources, we came to rely heavily on Soviet/Russian sources, with European weapons and equipment providing a certain balance of about 15 per cent of total acquisitions. Licence production was the dominant method to an extent when the understanding of “transfer of technology” only meant transfer of production technology, leaving us dependent on imports for replacements.

Given the geopolitical and techno-economic realities, Russia would remain our major partner in weapons and equipment programmes. And it is in this context that we need to see the recent, highly successful visit by the defence minister to Moscow. After a decade and a half of a virtual modernisation holiday, we need to go ahead with a robust procurement programme. The core of the change now visible in defence policy is that we are moving beyond the static and complacent, though comfortable, groove of licence production or outright imports that we had got into since the 1960s. The long-delayed joint development and manufacture of defence equipment has now been put firmly on the agenda.

It is well recognised that global reduction of defence forces, expenditure and procurement has been taking place since the end of the Cold War although under the Bush administration US defence spending has shown an upward shift. The result has been retrenchment in the defence industry worldwide. Manufacturing companies have been forced to cut back production and resort to mergers and collaborations in a major way. The European defence industry, which prided itself on a high degree of autonomy, has been forced into giving in to the US majors. US national laws and foreign policy now increasingly affect the sale and support of European weapon systems because of increasing interdependence of transatlantic industries. We experienced problems even in the overhaul of British supplied weapon systems like the naval Harrier jet fighter and the Sea King helicopter because the American components in them became subject to sanctions. The finalisation of the deal for the British Hawk AJT for the air force had been delayed because of difficulties in ensuring future product support. Direct procurement relationship with the US would go a long way in smoothening out the bumps along the road in the future. Our Russian connection, therefore, would remain important for a long while.

On the other hand, wars since 1990 have demonstrated the need and impact of high technology on warfighting capabilities. The historical lesson — that technological advantage very often proves crucial to victory — has been emphasised more than once in recent decades. The war in Afghanistan has highlighted an eight-fold jump in the use and effectiveness of precision munitions. The cost factor itself requires a shift in the focus of procurement policies. Russia has been our major supplier of weapons and equipment for four decades. But its economic difficulties have not only undermined its ability to continue the earlier long-term, credit-based arms trade policy, but have also almost emaciated its defence industry over the past decade. Russian procurement of weapons and equipment has also been severely cut back on account of both the retrenchment in the size of the forces as well as the shortage of funds. Under the circumstances it has tried hard to sustain its rather exceptional capabilities in the area of design and development of new systems. But the situation has also opened up new opportunities for both countries.

On our side, in spite of substantive experience and infrastructure in production of defence equipment, the area of design and development remains critically deficient. It is here that we need to focus policy, with regard to components, sub-systems and the big ticket items. The most symbolic lesson is that of the LCA. We did not even get down seriously to design a combat aircraft for 30 years since the HF-24 Marut project. Or a main battle tank, for that matter. And during those decades military technology advanced exponentially while our design teams were allowed to fade away. Our focus till recently, however, remained on prestigious projects and granite-floored buildings. The more recent changes augur well, if sustained and expanded. India’s decision to open the defence industry to the private sector and even foreign equity throws up unprecedented opportunities. Private industry can now play a seminal role beyond its traditional ancillary status which helped to expand industry in cities like Bangalore and Hyderabad.

Collaboration with other countries in design, development, production and product support taken to its logical conclusion has become a necessity. This would alter the self-reliance paradigm not only for us, but also equally for the Russian Federation. Russia has a strong design and development capability but would remain hobbled by low national demands and limited exports unless larger production runs make the projects economically viable. India has always been the model for developing countries in maximising the Soviet design weapons and technology, which the designers in turn further improved upon. India is again the window through which Russia hopes to expand its exports as its projected sales to Malaysia indicate. Indigenous capabilities for production of spares and components remains low in spite of the Self Reliance Initiative announced with fanfare seven years ago.

In Moscow Defence Minister George Fernandes confirmed plans for joint development of the fifth generation combat aircraft. Joint development of a medium lift transport aircraft for the Russian and Indian air forces is also on the agenda. Joint development of BrahMos super-sonic anti-ship missile serves as a beacon. India must get a share of Russian Su-30 production. Collaboration must extend to components and sub-systems which could be handled through the private sector. We need to link up with industrial countries for joint development, production and sales. And Russia has opportunities that it would do well to maximise if it can keep its costs low for larger production runs.

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