Dissemination of defence information either in Parliament or through the public relations machinery has remained an exercise in suppression rather than education. The Nehruvian tradition of misinforming the House about military matters has persisted over the years. Then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru misinformed the House about the Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin during the late 1950s. Thereafter, under Rajiv Gandhi's premiership in the late 1980s, the public had more questions than answers over the Chinese intrusion into the Sumdorung Chu Valley on the India-China border.

A SAMPLE of parliamentary questions and answers in the last couple of months shows that the same trend continues which only perpetuates the military `illiteracy' of our parliamentarians. Too much unnecessary secrecy becomes a breeding ground for corruption, misuse and nepotism.

n (Q) Whether the Arun Singh Committee on Defence Expenditure (CDE) has made a number of recommendations including the need for restructuring the entire higher defence organisation. (February '97)

(A) A number of recommendations were made by the CDE headed by Shri Arun Singh, in a series of reports which the committee itself classified `secret'. Besides, the reports also commented on sensitive matters which were not included in its terms of reference. It is not desirable to disclose the details of the report, which are both secret and sensitive.

COMMENT

Sensitivity stems from the report dealing with the relationship between the civil and military bureaucracies. If the CDE recommendations relate to structural changes or the decision-making process which have a direct bearing on expenditure management in defence, it should not be kept secret as it involves public interest. Particularly in view of the large defence budget.

n (Q) (a) Whether the Trishul surface-to-air missile was successfully test fired on 29 December 1996 (b) if so, the main features of the missile and how far it was successful (c) by when the Trishul missiles are likely to be deployed with the armed forces.

(A) (a) Trishul missile was flight-tested on December 28, 1996. (b) Trishul is a short-range quick-reaction surface-to-air missile. During the developmental flight test of the missile on December 28 after successful take off some deviations were observed.

The main objective, however, of evaluating the command guidance during initial flight was gone through successfully as per mission requirements. A series of flight trials will be commencing. (c) Trishul missile will enter the user's trial phase during the second half of 1997 after which it will enter the production and induction phase.

COMMENT

THE fact that `deviations were observed' is an attempt to play down the disaster characterising the Trishul missile. Instead of expanding on the setbacks the response economises on the truth and does not reflect the realities in this case.

(Q) Whether the Government proposes to set up Army's Air Defence Training Centre in Orissa (b) If so, details thereof (c) Whether the Government also proposes to establish a military hospital in the State to start smooth functioning of the training centre (d) if so by when? (5 May, '97)

(A) (a) &(b): Yes Sir, there is a proposal to set up an Air Defence Guided Missile School (ADGMS) and Centre at Gopalpur in Orissa. (c) & (d) Sanction has been accorded for establishment of a 75-bed military hospital at Gopalpur and the building for this purpose has been constructed.

COMMENT

The answer to `details thereof' has been glossed over. Normally, a centre and school are co-located at the same place to enable smooth administration and training. In this case, the school and centre are at different locations with the school situated at Gopalpur and the centre at Nasik.

Army parlance refers to a school as an institution which imparts specialist training to officers, junior commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers. Likewise, a centre trains raw recruits into skilled soldiers.

The truth is that the ADGMS is functioning from a building meant to be a military hospital. The entire project for shifting the ADGMS centre to Gopalpur has been hijacked by the Defence Ministry to channel the funds for deficit financing. Earlier, the project for the centre was cleared by one wing of the Defence Ministry but another wing intentionally raised objections with a view to buy time. Such a delay would ensure that the allocated funds could not be spent in the financial year ending March 31, 1997 and thereby diverted elsewhere.

(Q) (a) The names of places in Uttar Pradesh that the Defence Minister has visited by Air Force and Army aircraft and helicopters from July 1996 to January 31, 1997 along with the number of times he visited these places (b) the details regarding purpose of the said visits (c) whether other civilians besides Army officials accompanied the Defence Minister during the visits, if so, details of persons who accompanied him (d) the details of expenditure incurred on these visits?

(A) (a) to (d) : The Defence Minister uses Services aircraft in the discharge of his functions. Divulging the purpose of each journey and other details would not be in public interest.

COMMENT

The names of different places that the Defence Minister visited by Army/Air Force aircraft should logically be military establishments or to meet ex-servicemen elsewhere.

This is no secret purely because every single defence establishment is listed in general knowledge books available in the market.

Except for one such `hush hush' Home Ministry institution staffed by Army personnel, namely the Special Frontier Force Headquarters at Chakrata, Uttar Pradesh, which has received wide publicity owing to scandals years ago in the national print media.

Details about the visits are largely ceremonial like meeting military personnel or confined to inspections. Any such serious visit disclosing which might impinge on operational security could be termed `inspection'.

Suppressing details of expenditure incurred on these airborne visits in no way goes against national interest and instead promotes taxpayers interests.

(Q) (a) Whether major foreign suppliers of defence hardware and equipment have set up liaison offices in the country (b) if so, whether the Government deals with those liaison offices (c) if so, the names of the liaison officers with their principals known to the Government (d) whether the liaison offices act as middlemen and their chiefs receive a part of their emoluments in terms of their contracts they secure; and if so details thereof?

(A) (a) to (e): Major foreign suppliers of defence hardware and equipment establish liaison offices in India based on their corporate policies. The policy on foreign commercial entities setting up representative offices is determined and implemented by the RBI and Finance Ministry. In so far as the purchase of weapons and weapon systems is concerned, the government policy is to deal directly with the original equipment manufacturers.

COMMENT

Except for `bureaucratese' or civil service language the response does not answer the query about ``the names of the liaison officers with their principals known to the Government''.

(Q) (a) Whether India's armoury needs replacement (b) if so, whether India needs 155 mm howitzer guns, submarines, combat aircraft and advanced jet trainers

(A) (a) & (b): Modernisation, updating and new inductions into the armed forces is a continuing process.

COMMENT

Apparently, the response does not address the specific requirements of hardware which have been clearly named in the query conveying a subtle indication that Parliamentarians are not encouraged to debate defence intelligently in the House.

Copyright © 1997 Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Ltd.