The self-reliance mantra

Enduring interests in the war against terrorism

PRIME MINISTER Atal Bihari Vajpayee recently admitted that there is some disappointment in India that the US is not as sensitive to Indian concerns on terrorism as we had expected. I was told by senior members of the US establishment over the last three weeks that the US is also disappointed about India not appreciating the extent to which the US campaign against terrorism is safeguarding Indian security concerns. It is in this context of mutual disappointments that US Secretary of State Colin Powell held discussions in New Delhi on October 16 and 17.

It rankles public opinion in India that the US chose Pakistan over India as an active partner in its campaign against international terrorism, despite India offering unconditional support to the US. Indeed, the US has supported Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir against Indian interests. It seems the US is not interested in acting against terrorism sponsored by Pakistan. It is only concerned with terrorism directed against itself and its allies in Western Europe and Japan. Also, that the restoration of economic and military assistance in return for its support will strengthen Pakistan’s position. This is bound to adversely affect Indian security interests resulting in an arms race in the subcontinent.

Powell’s statement that Kashmir is ‘‘a central issue’’ in Indo-Pak relations has been objected to by India. India asserted that it is cross-border terrorism and not Kashmir which is the central issue. These disappointments were conveyed to Powell during his discussions with our political leaders. Powell’s responses were based on the following assumptions:

First, there is a genuine appreciation of the sympathy and support extended by India to the US. Second, Pakistan has been made a partner in the coalition due to substantive geo-strategic and operational reasons. Third, the cooperation between Pakistan and the US is not going to erode Indo-US relations in any manner. Fourth, although unstated, the US co-opted Pakistan into its anti-terrorist coalition (specially in operational terms) under some pre-conditions. These have resulted in Musharraf dissociating his government from the extremist Taliban factions in Afghanistan and from Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda movement.

Musharraf has also been persuaded to arrest fundamentalist leaders like Fazlur Rehman and take restrictive action against extremist parties and political groups in Pakistan. Musharraf has transferred or removed seven out of 11 senior army commanders, who opposed his support to the US. Of them, General Aziz and the ISI chief, General Mehmood Ahmad, were active in fomenting terrorism in Kashmir.

Powell, while stating that Kashmir is central to normalising Indo-Pakistan relations in Islamabad, had also mentioned that the terrorist bombing of the J&K Assembly was wrong and unacceptable. He also emphasised that a solution to the Kashmir issue has to be achieved by bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan.

In earlier official statements, the US government had stressed that while these negotiations take place, the existing Line of Control and boundaries should be respected by all concerned.

The US has frozen the assets of not just the Al-Qaeda movement and other foreign organisations linked with it in Europe and elsewhere, but also those of the extremist Islamic groups located in Pakistan.

The US has repeatedly emphasised that the campaign against terrorism will be long drawn out and will target all categories of international terrorism.

The US military campaign in Afghanistan leading to the elimination of terrorist training camps and arms stockpiles there may significantly reduce the capacities of terrorists originating in Afghanistan and Pakistan to operate against India.

The US and India have signed an agreement during Powell’s visit to counter international terrorist activities, with legal and juridical provisions which consolidates the existing institutional consultative arrangements to counter terrorism.

The US government is not intending to tilt towards Pakistan to the detriment of Indo-US relations.

Musharraf’s government could be persuaded to adopt a more rational and practical approach towards India in the momentum of Pakistani policies supporting the US against terrorism, even if this phenomenon emerges under pressure and with reservations. This may be conducive to the beginning of a gradual exercise of resuming substantive Indo-Pakistan dialogue.

The US government feels that the Indian media and public opinion are not taking sufficient cognisance of these positive trends which is the best that the US can do for India at this stage within the framework of its own national interests. To expect the US to designate Pakistan as a terrorism-sponsoring state when Pakistan is an active participant in their campaign against terrorism is impractical.

A government under the leadership of the Northern Alliance cannot be stable in Afghanistan because it consists mainly of Uzbeks, Tajhiks and some Hazaras. All the three are minority communities in Afghanistan, compared to the combined demographic size of the Pathans or the Pushtoons. Any new government in Afghanistan would have to have large-scale representation of various segments of the Pushtoon tribes.

Given the recent confrontation between the Pushtoons and non-Pushtoons in Afghanistan, creating a coalition of representatives of all the constituent ethnic groups would be a delicate exercise. The Musharraf government may also resort to diverting extremist Islamic resentment towards India from their present focus against the Pakistan government, a situation pregnant with negative security implications for India.

During Powell’s visit to Islamabad, Pakistan demanded the full restoration of multi-faceted relations between the US and Pakistan and withdrawal of sanctions against Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and missile capacities. Also, that the US should not include the violence occurring in Kashmir within the ambit of its anti-terrorist campaign and should put pressure on India to compromise on the Kashmir issue with Pakistan. Powell’s reported response was positive on the first, second and fourth demands with some riders which respect Indian concerns and sensitivities.

The central message for India in these developments is two-fold: First, that we should not predicate our policies taking the US or Pakistani policies for granted. These would be focussed on their respective national interests. Second, that India would have to be primarily self-reliant in resolving its problems related to terrorism and in managing its security environment.