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Welcome
to Moscowashington
After Sept 11, the big boys are joining hands, how do we play
ours?
As
the subcontinent fetes Colin Powell, step back three decades
in time, almost to date. Then get down to figuring out this
funny new world. This is when Henry Kissinger was asking the
Chinese to beat us up so we couldn’t thrash the Pakistanis.
The Cold War was at its hottest, its master player was unveiling
a move that would ultimately win it for his side. Incidentally,
just this week, both Kissinger and Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji
flew into Delhi on the same day. They were also speaking a
very different language.
Cut back 30 years again. This was also
when Indira Gandhi was giving our supreme national interest
a new, post-Nehru definition within four parameters. One,
that the territorial boundaries of India should not diminish
from what emerged after the Bangladesh war. Two, that India
should become, and remain, a nuclear weapons power. Three,
that India should remain the pre-eminent power in the region.
Four, that India should acquire and retain the leadership
of the non-aligned (mostly third) world. This last principle
was easily rendered outdated by the end of the Cold War.
But remember how we protested when the Americans
decided to set up a base at Diego Garcia even if it was an
island nearly 10 hours of jet flying time away from our shores?
Now we jubilate over the fact that the Americans have bases
at Jacobabad and Pasni, just about an hour’s — subsonic —
flight from New Delhi. In 1987, Rajiv Gandhi’s megaphones
justified sending the IPKF to Sri Lanka because the Voice
of America had set up a relay station there. Today, we might
send a bouquet and a ‘‘best wishes’’ note if they were to
set up full-fledged broadcast stations at Kabul or Kathmandu.
In the past, we would get neurotic even if a Royal Navy ship
visited Trincomalee. Now we are happy to refuel and service
the US navy at our ports, or run escorts, protecting their
merchantmen from the pirates in the Gulf of Molucca.
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In
the changed world, there’s no one you can play against
the other. No refuge in alliances, no security in numbers.
This is a world whose mind is made up on the big issues,
it has a map of the world, the new power equation in
mind and, frankly, no one can take on this new world
order. For, you will then be taking on the world
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THE important thing is not that we have
changed. But that everything, the world around us, has changed
so completely that no one, not China, not Russia, not even
Cuba, is protesting. No one questions this new global American
power today except a handful of rogue states and, of course,
our own Comrade Harkishen Singh Surjeet. There is, however,
more to this new world than mere unipolarity. That would have
been simpler to deal with. You can always stand up to a hegemony.
It is a great moral position and it might always be possible
to build an alliance against it. But what do you do with a
world where the big boys cartelise in a manner unprecedented
in history? They think and act together, with a remarkable
common sense of purpose and, ostensibly, towards greater common
good.
The remarkable thing about this new world
is that no two big powers have an intractable problem between
them. We might have one with Pakistan, the US has one with
Iraq, but Pakistan and Iraq are no big powers. The US, China,
United Europe and Russia, if you so wish to describe them,
are the four powers that circumscribe this world. The next
concentric circle in this new architecture is formed by what
you might describe as the ‘‘deputy’’ big powers. France, Britain,
Japan and, happily, India. None of these has a major problem
between themselves. You might fantasise about a future Sino-American
conflict or a militarised Japan, but those possibilities are
still only in the realm of the thriller writer’s imagination.
Unless a radically irredentist China acts madly enough to
grab Taiwan by force tomorrow, or an Osama acquires control
of the entire Islamic world and OPEC, you do not see this
arrangement being disturbed in a hurry. Or, if a Zhirinovsky
took over Russia. Long shot, but you’ve got to leave something
for the future Le Carres and Forsyths.
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If
an Indo-Pak conflict seems to get out of hand, particularly
if it got any closer to a nuclear exchange, intervention
will come collectively from the US, Russia and China.
Europe, Japan will do their bit, too. To gain from this,
we need to be pragmatic, look beyond old-fashioned nationalism,
ideology
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Until that happens, you now have a world
where the big boys would act in unison and leave you no one
to run to. No one to play against the other. No Russian veto.
No non-aligned unity. No refuge in alliances, no security
in numbers. Today’s world, particularly after September 11,
does not provide any Third Front kind of politicking opportunities.
Its mind is made up on the big issues, it has a map of the
world, the power equations sorted out and, frankly, no one
can take on this new order. Because that amounts to taking
on the world. You cannot fight this order but you can certainly
work it to your advantage as we have happily done so far.
THE challenge, therefore, is not of challenging
this order but of going out and engaging with it, becoming
a player and in the new game. Post-December 13, we have actually
done quite a brilliant job of it already. Our diplomatic drive
has moved quite marvellously, powered along by a military
build-up not even seen during 1971. We convinced Pakistan,
and the world at large, that this was no play-acting and that
we were quite open to the idea of taking the build-up to its
logical conclusion. And how did the new world respond? The
Americans and the British started shuttle diplomacy, that
was rehearsed and choreographed to a fault. The Americans
told the Chinese and the Russians to lean on their Pakistani
and Indian friends, respectively. Musharraf was given that
message on his two successive visits to Beijing. Similarly,
it was Russia that said that India and Pakistan should be
‘‘compelled’’ to talk. If the US had said this, we would have
gone ballistic. But when our Russian friends speak that language,
we better listen. Also, take stock of this strange world where
the presidents of the US and Russia are personal friends.
The beauty of this new arrangement is that
it is fundamentally inclusivist. Syria being a member of an
anti- (mostly Islamic and Arab) terrorist coalition may sound
absurd. Or Pakistan? But the buzzword now is inclusion and
co-option and not exclusion or isolation. Everybody is to
be given a bit role in this orchestra. Why else would the
conclave to find a new post-Taliban arrangement take place
in Bonn? And now the international meeting on the reconstruction
of Afghanistan happens in Tokyo. The unipolar world has now
moved on to becoming — to steal an old expression from pioneering
environmentalist Lester R. Brown — a world without borders.
DO we have the temperament to join this
big boy’s club and take advantage of this change? So far we
have worked this remarkably well. But we have to keep on making
course corrections, to avoid the temptation of harking back
on nostalgia and shooting from the hip, full of memories of
the years of non-alignment and Cold War. In this world, there
is no place for a spoiler, the abominable no-man. This change
has far too much weight and momentum to brook any distraction
now. That is why such impatience with regional conflicts:
an India-Pakistan war, the Middle East crisis, a revived Iran-Iraq
rivalry will come in the way of this juggernaut. Intervention
will then not come from the US alone. If an India-Pakistan
conflict seemed to get out of hand, for example, particularly
if it got any closer to a nuclear exchange, intervention will
come collectively from the US, Russia and China. Europe and
Japan will also do their bit, to the extent that they matter.
India is uniquely placed to gain from this.
But we have to be pragmatic, and realistic, to embrace this
arrangement. There is no place here for old-fashioned nationalism
and ideology. We will need to urgently forget the non-aligned
nostalgia, the fantasy of playing one superpower against the
other, and all other fantasies as they assail our minds or
conscience: being part of an US encirclement of China or,
contrarily, of a Russo-Sino-Indian axis against American power.
Meanwhile, Francis Fukuyama could be penning his next classic
after ‘‘The End of History’’. Could we suggest ‘‘The End of
War’’ as a likely title?
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