Our DRDO and don’ts

Commenting on the DRDO in isolation, without looking at the higher defence management framework within which it is placed, would perhaps lead to incomplete or even flawed deductions. Besides the services headquarters, the ministry of defence has the defence secretary and three other branches run by secretary-level officers. They are the secretaries, defence production, defence finance and defence R&D. Though they are deemed to be equal in status to the defence secretary, it is the defence secretary who wields the greater authority and who plays the pivotal role. Service chiefs and the other secretaries may interact with the defence minister but all coordination and policy formulation is through the defence secretary.

The point being made is that if the DRDO has not delivered for so many years, the blame must also rest with the higher defence and national security management apparatus to include the political leadership and bureaucrats for having been complicit in the DRDO’s failures. The problems of the DRDO begin from here, in that never has it been really held accountable for its breach of commitments. Occasionally, there may have been the odd adverse comment but beyond that the establishment has continually turned a blind eye to the DRDO’s poor performance.

National security demands that the country’s defence forces be of a size and potency that dissuades and deters potential adversaries against adventures like Kargil, or for that matter even the ongoing militancy and terrorism in J&K. The conclusion thus to be drawn is that there must be greater sanctity to the requirements that the defence services project together with accountability of those responsible for implementation of procurement plans.

The issues of self-reliance and indigenous production would acquire a clearer perspective if they were viewed against the backdrop of the capability projections of the three services. Against anticipated budgets, the services put up five-year plans for modernisation, expansion and capability accretion. These are within the framework of the desired service profile to be achieved within 15 years. Once whetted, these profiles must become the collective responsibility of all the departments of the MOD, including defence production and finance. The DRDO then must join the chorus instead of singing a different tune all the time. Having said this, it is also true that there would be slippages.

... contd.