A country’s borders define it in more ways than one. Six years ago as a part of then foreign minister, Jaswant Singh’s entourage that crossed over a narrow ramshackle bridge from Moreh, India’s outpost, to enter into Burma’s Tamu, one could not help noticing that even the border town’s civil administration was handled by a retired major of the ruling State Peace and Development Committee. After inaugurating the historic 160 km Tamu-Kalewa road built by Indian Border Roads the same day, it was the signboard at the Royal Mandalay Palace, seat of the last hereditary Burmese King Mindon, that confirmed for the visitors how strong was the ruling military junta’s grip. Written in red in English, it said: “The Tatmadaw (army) shall never let the nation down.”
These past days, US President George Bush and the Indian Left have joined hands to ask New Delhi to use its influence to get the Burmese junta to the dialogue table with the dissident monks fighting for restoration of democracy. But the present foreign minister, Pranab Mukherjee’s response is a predictable reiteration of India’s policy of non-intervention. It is not that India does not support democracy. The fact is that New Delhi has precious little option, given Burma’s influence in containing militant groups operating from across the border in the Northeast.
Since the launch of Operation Goldenbird in 1995 on the tip of Mizoram, the ruling SPDC has made significant efforts not to allow Indian Northeast groups like NSCN (I-M), NSCN (K), ULFA and PLA to establish training camps in Burma. The fact is that at least thrice between 2002 and 2005, the Burmese army suffered serious casualties in hunting down Indian militants in the Sagaing division across Nagaland. By establishing radio links between its Northwest Command and Indian Army’s III Corps at Moreh, the junta routinely warns the other side about militant crossings or arms shipments. Not only has the junta taken action time and again against ULFA camps in the Vijaynagar salient across the Arunachal Pradesh border, it has put a check on arms supply to the Indian insurgents from distant Ranong on the Thailand border via Myanmar. Operation Leech in 1998 in which Arakanese gun-runners were covertly killed by the Indian forces was a direct result of this cooperation.
If internal security was paramount to the Indo-Burmese equation, the growing Chinese influence in Burma, after the latter was shunned by many...
