State of complicity

Understanding why requires an analysis of the current market for corruption. As in any market demand (the bribe-taker) and supply (the complicit bribe-giver) operate in tandem. Much of the focus has been on the demand side and we are all familiar with these arguments. The need of the day is radical administrative reform. But this requires strong political will, which is conspicuous by its absence.

This brings us to the second and relatively under-discussed aspect of the market for corruption — its supply side. Is it not extraordinary that in an effective, well functioning electoral democracy, corruption has almost never been a significant electoral issue at any level — national, state or local Panchayat?

Some answers to this puzzle can be found in an analysis of the supply side of corruption. For this, we need to make a distinction between the different experiences of corruption across sections of society.

First, let us look at corruption amongst the poorest; for whom access to Government programmes is a matter of survival. A study on corruption levels in Orissa revealed that a poor citizen had to go through 11 stages of bureaucratic and political hurdles and pay bribes of over Rs 2,000 to access a death compensation of Rs 75,000. For someone living on less than Rs 40 a day, Rs 2,000 is a significant amount of money, but this is paid out of necessity. Collective action amongst the poorest is difficult because of the very vulnerabilities that make coercion possible — they are unaware of their rights and often locked in exploitative patron-client relationships.

Let’s now turn to corruption amongst the relatively better off — the elites in rural societies. For them the state is a means of fulfilling greater aspirations of social mobility, and corruption is part of the deal. This needs to be...