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 • My guest this week is Brajesh Mishra, former National Security Advisor, former principal secretary to the prime minister, and the chief architect of India’s new strategic positioning in the post-Cold War world. He was also initiator of India’s new positioning with respect to the U.S., of which the 123 deal looks like the logical next step. When you made a departure of sorts from India’s Cold War diplomacy, it was a breakthrough in India’s way of understanding its position in the world. You should be happy your successors have carried on.

Yes, of course. The NDA government, with which I was associated for six years, had an agenda. In that scheme, the U.S. had a pre-eminent place and it could lead to a strategic partnership.

• Is that why it’s called the next step in strategic partnership?

We made a gradual move forward. After all, in both, the U.S. and India, there are reservations about each other. We live in democracies so that is natural. So we wanted to move step by step. That’s why it is called the next step. My idea, when this was announced in July 2005, was to safeguard our strategic programme while pushing for good relations with the U.S. and getting the sanctions on high technology and goods removed.

• The 123 deal was announced in July 2005, the major deal, the joint agreement. On July 18, 2005.

There was reference to India working with the U.S. in Geneva. In March last year, when U.S. President George W. Bush was here, he came to an agreement about separating India’s civil nuclear facilities from military ones. When they announced this, my apprehensions grew. The government has agreed to put 14 of our reactors under safeguards. Now where’s the fissile material.

• Are the rest of the reactors enough to produce that?

Let me explain that in detail. India has a no-first-use policy, which means you have to have enough weapons, both nuclear and thermal, to get your potential, so that your enemy knows that he could be targeted if he were to initiate such things. In these times, the credibility of that risk has to remain high.

• A country like Pakistan almost has the first-use policy.

It has said very clearly that it doesn’t rule it out. Even then I came to the conclusion that by agreeing to the separation plan, by agreeing to work with the U.S. and not others on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), the 2005 agreement in Geneva, the government was showing little concern in this respect. But since I have very good relations with the U.S., I recognise that this deal has a very important role in the strategic partnership between the two countries.

• How much is enough in terms of fissile material? How many reactors would you have put under safeguards?

Not more than two.

• This government says it has top secret documents that you had offered to put 70 per cent of the facilities under safeguards for a deal that was half of this deal.

That is not correct. In 2003, when I was in Washington, we said we would put a couple of our reactors under safeguards. And all those to be built would be under international surveillance. The Americans did not respond to this suggestion. If they had, it would have become clear what would be put under safeguards. If I were there, I’d not have put more than two under safeguards.

• So it’s absolutely wrong that you would have put 70 per cent of the reactors under safeguards, even at a point when we were moving towards acceptance of CTBT.

If you look at then prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s statement in the U.N. General Secretariat in September 1998, he said we’re prepared to move towards adherence of CTBT but expect others to do the same.

• Because we did nearly put a voluntary moratorium on testing.

We had a moratorium as soon as the testing was over in 1998. We said we are not going to test again. Moratorium is different from CTBT. One article in CTBT says a certain number of countries have to adhere to CTBT before it comes into effect. Vajpayee said he was prepared to accept CTBT but expected others, including America, to do the same.

• Tomorrow, if the U.S. and other significant countries were to accept CTBT, will it be all right for India to join?

We could never remain outside when everybody joins — including our neighbour Pakistan.

• If Hillary comes to power tomorrow and she gets the Congress to sign up for CTBT, you think India will have no choice but to join CTBT?

If 40-odd countries also join.

• We will have no choice.

Pakistan. Israel. China, which has signed it but not ratified it. Iran, if it is named, has to do it.

• You say the military reactors which have been left out of the 123 deal are not enough for minimum credible deterrence. But we can build more military reactors.

But building reactors is not that easy. As far as the strategic programme is concerned, the adverse impact is whether one wants to have the deal or not.

• Tell me, you have the mind of a modern-day Chanakya, how does one save the deal and the Indo-U.S. relationship? If you were advising the UPA government, how could they get out of this.

Before I answer that question, let me make it clear I’m not going to be speaking on behalf of any political party or any leadership.

• You may speak as an architect of this new strategic shift in India’s foreign policy.

This is a very personal opinion.