The Sri Lankan Government announced the formal end to the 2002 Norwegian-mediated ceasefire with the Tamil rebel group, the Liberation Tigers for Tamil Eelam (LTTE), from January 16, 2008. By the end, the ceasefire was in name only, with both sides engaging in low to mid-intensity warfare to achieve conflicting goals; the LTTE is fighting for a separate state for the Tamil minority in the northeast while the Sri Lankan government aims to hold on to the territorial integrity within a centralised unitary set-up. The formal termination of the agreement signals a return to full-scale military warfare by both sides.
What did the ceasefire agreement (CFA) impose on both sides? It ushered in a ‘no war, no peace’ situation. The February 2002 agreement had four articles. Article 1 dealt with the separation of the fighting forces; Article 2 dealt with measures necessary to bring normalcy to civilian life in the northeast; Article 3 stipulated the duties and obligations of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (comprising Nordic monitors from Iceland, Finland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden); and Article 4 contained the standard exit clauses on how the agreement could be terminated by either party. The agreement emphasised security issues, particularly military strategic parity, not political solutions; furthermore, it stabilised the lines of control acquired by the LTTE in the northern and eastern parts of the country. Despite frequent violations by both sides, particularly since 2006, the CFA acted as a check on an open declaration of war. From 2002-2006, the SLMM found that the government had violated the CFA 346 times and the LTTE, 3827 times. The LTTE used the ceasefire to attain international legitimacy and to build a de facto state in the north with armed forces, bureaucracy, courts and police under the control of Prabhakaran. The Sri Lankan government used the CFA to rebuild its arsenal and military.
