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Baalu system
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Natwar Singh, looking at T.R. Baalu’s jaunty and so-far-successful reinterpretation of nepotism, may be wondering why fathers and sons get into more trouble over oil than gas. But, of course, it’s not different hydrocarbons but different political parties that explain the contrasting receptions to the two ministerial-entrepreneurial ventures. Singh was from the Congress and Baalu is from a Congress coalition ally.
Even if Baalu juniors had got what their father had promised — much is being made of the fact that the gas wasn’t delivered, a pitiful argument by any definition of political conduct — it is extremely doubtful Manmohan Singh would have seriously considered creating a ministerial vacancy. The reason is not because the PMO itself is embroiled in the controversy. In fact, ministers who embarrass PMs personally are especially likely to be sacked in an ordinary system of cabinet governance. We however have a sabotaged system of cabinet governance. True, this is a spectacularly commonplace observation about Indian politics now. But there are some not-so-obvious implications. Implications we need to debate seriously since the “metropolitan fantasy” of an effective two-party system is not about to obtain (your correspondent happily admits to being such a fantasist) and another general election is due.
Are we entering a long period of institutionalised policy chaos? The BJP-led government that was formed in 1999 also had to negotiate with allies on ministry distribution. But significantly it took away communications and civil aviation from allies in a 2001 reshuffle (Sharad Yadav and Ram Vilas Paswan, respectively, were the “victims”). The Congress was in a weaker position in 2004 than the BJP was in 1999. So it was and is in no position to take away key ministries from its allies despite concerns similar to or even stronger than those the BJP had in 2001. Shibu Soren’s long-delayed departure from coal is obviously not a valid example. And TRS’s Chandrasekhara Rao himself quit the UPA. If national parties become weaker in the next elections, this trend will take a firmer hold.
Already, A. Raja in communications can blithely ignore even prime ministerial observations that spectrum should be auctioned. Vajpayee shifted Paswan out of communications for far less overt unruliness. Whether spectrum should be auctioned or not is a hugely important question and whatever the decision, it has to be the whole government’s and sanctioned by the PM.
When Pramod Mahajan was the NDA’s communications minister, the government took the controversial decision on allowing wireless in local loop (WLL) telephony under conditions that were deemed by many as favouring particular service providers. But at least the PMO and the ministry were in sync. There was one policy that could be critiqued. The consequences of what is happening under the UPA are not fully with us as yet. But it will get uglier and the biggest loss will be the Centre’s policy credibility.
Just because this sounds boring doesn’t mean this is trivial. If allies get more and more key economic portfolios and the national party’s disciplining power gets circumscribed, mini policy republics will be created in those very sectors that need carefully considered and widely understood policy paradigm shifts. Yes, Lalu Yadav and Praful Patel have served the UPA and policy well. But if they hadn’t, there was nothing Manmohan Singh could have done. Dr Singh has simply watched Baalu reduce the highway project to a personal battle against highway authority directors. He has watched Paswan being a huge misfit for a pharmaceutical sector that, like information technology, has the potential to be world class. He has watched coal going on a policy sabbatical because of Shibu Soren for most of the UPA’s term.
If the next government is BJP-led with an UPA-like arithmetic, will L.K. Advani be able to do things differently? Advani can’t comfort himself by saying Manmohan Singh is a weak PM (which he is, in some ways). Even if Arjun Singh and Pranab Mukherjee were fearful of Dr Singh, Baalu, Paswan, Raja would not have been. The same situation will apply to Advani unless the BJP’s numbers are big enough.
If we take the trend of national parties getting fewer seats as given — it would be wonderful to be proved wrong — is there a solution? The BJP or the Congress can have the political version of a pre-nuptial agreement with allies: allies can pick their own ministers once the ministries have been negotiated but the prime minister will have the right to remove an allied party minister, with the concession that the allied party, in consultation with the prime minister, can suggest a replacement.
This is a second or a third best solution. Allies should not be able to book a ministry for the whole term. And even this rule won’t probably work when the troublesome allied party minister is also the allied party supreme leader. You can’t consult with Ram Vilas Paswan on who will replace Ram Vilas Paswan. But the first best solution, which Vajpayee applied a few times, is impossible now.
This way, at least, allied party ministers who are not party chiefs will have some disincentive against going off on a policy tangent. It is possible to imagine that had this agreement prevailed, Dr Singh could have, after discussions with Karunanidhi about Raja’s policy statements, frightened the DMK minister a bit. Or that Dr Singh would have had a say when Karunanidhi wanted Dayanidhi Maran out of the cabinet.
Will the likes of Karunanidhi agree? Regional parties like the DMK have grown used to the idea of treating the government in New Delhi as a sum of independently run lucrative parking lots. But they still need one of the national parties to get into the parking lot. If both the BJP and the Congress adopt this rule about restoring some dignity back to the concept of prime ministerial prerogative, regional allies won’t be able to play one against the other on this count. And clearly it is in the BJP’s and the Congress’s interest to adopt this rule.
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