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 The India-US statement and the subsequent discussions have generated a lot of discussion, charges and counter-charges. The following is an attempt to clarify some of the issues in simple terms. The attempt will be to compare the environment in terms of some of the factors that have a role in evaluating the impact of the agreement when it is complete in all respects — that is, after the completion of the 123 agreement, the NSG amendment and the India-specific IAEA safeguards agreement. The elements that will be compared are: one, the international environment in the nuclear arena, two, the Indian strategic nuclear programme, and three, the Indian civil nuclear programme.

International nuclear relations

India had decided not to sign the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) because of the inherent unequal nature of the treaty which sought to legitimise the nuclear weapon status of five countries that had already detonated nuclear devices. The non-nuclear weapon states, as defined by the NPT, were expected to forego nuclear weapons and engage only in civil nuclear programmes.

In 1992 the Nuclear Suppliers Group modified their nuclear transfer guidelines to require all non-nuclear weapon states to agree to IAEA fullscope safeguards placing all nuclear activities in their control under IAEA safeguards. Both as a matter of principle and also since it had a nuclear programme, India did not accept IAEA fullscope safeguards in India. As a result NSG members are barred from civilian nuclear transfers to India. In what manner, if any, would the agreement change this international nuclear environment? (See Table 1)

India’s strategic nuclear programme

The Indian strategic programme is a long-standing one and is one of the pillars of Indian national security paradigm under the current international political environment. This strategic programme is critically dependent on, one, the Indian technical capabilities, two, the availability of nuclear material for the strategic programme, and three, the availability of delivery systems, especially missiles.

The technical capabilities may involve both theoretical and experimental programmes, in both nuclear and non-nuclear components and systems. The nuclear material for the nuclear devices can be both of weapons-grade material and the non-weapon grade, primarily reactor-grade Plutonium (Pu). The weapons-grade material is obtained from two reactors CIRUS and Dhruva and the reactor-grade Pu from the unsafeguarded indigenous reactors. How will the environment be affected by the agreement? (See Table 2)

India’s civil nuclear programme

The Indian civil nuclear programme is concerned with the development and construction of nuclear power reactors for electricity generation and possibly other civil uses. The three-stage programme consists of the first stage Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR) fuelled with natural uranium, the second stage Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR) fuelled with Pu and the third stage Thorium reactors. The current estimate of natural uranium reserves in India will satisfy the requirements of 10,000 MWe PHWR capacity. The Pu will come from the reprocessing of spent fuel from the PHWR and Light Water Reactors (LWR) that may be imported. How will they be affected?

The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) in their projections for the civil nuclear programme in India had projected that with only an additional import of 6 GWe (6000 MWe) of LWR till 2020, the contribution of nuclear power generation can increase from 208 GWe to 275 GWe by 2052! (See Table 3)

What is the importance of the India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement, the so-called 123 agreement, in all this? Will the benefits of the agreement come about without NSG amendments to allow for nuclear transfers to

India? No. Will the NSG amend its Guidelines without a 123 agreement? No.

The writer is visiting fellow at IDSA and National Maritime Foundation