




All the murkiness and trivialities apart, this crisis has been caused by three differing worldviews, of how India looks at the post-Cold War world, its own position and stature there, and what it needs to do to further its interests. It is the first time in our history that foreign and strategic policy has become such an issue. So far, these policies had more or less been run on the basis of a consensus, Nehruvian for most of the first 25 years after Independence, and then only moved further in the same direction by Indira Gandhi. There was no debate on India’s prominent role in the non-aligned movement which tilted distinctly towards the Soviet Union, the underdog in the Cold War. This larger formulation was not challenged politically even when India took positions on the pulverisation of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and then Afghanistan, over almost three decades. Barring the hiccup of the 1962 defeat when the Nehruvian foreign policy paradigm was questioned, there wasn’t much doubt even on our policy on our borders, neighbours, and nuclear weapons.
On our border disputes, that consensus is contained in two unanimous resolutions of Parliament, which, if followed in letter and spirit, would require us to raise armies to recover all captured territories from China and Pakistan. On the nuclear issue too, when Indira Gandhi conducted Pokharan I, the opposition mostly applauded. Similarly, on Pokharan II, Kargil and then Operation Parakram, the Congress more or less played along as a loyal and “consensual” opposition.
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