Through all the accusations and counter-accusations in Parliament, one name figured prominently - Strobe Talbott, who negotiated with the then foreign minister Jaswant Singh, in the aftermath of the second Pokharan tests. Talbott’s account of Indo-US interactions at the time, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb, was brandished by both Pranab Mukherjee and Lalu Prasad Yadav, to set the record straight on Vajpayee’s assurances to the Clinton government on signing the CTBT.

Pranab Mukherjee: “Whether they will re-negotiate and whether they will have re-negotiation on the equal terms or not, I am not going to that aspect to speculate... sometimes, we draw our conclusions from what has happened in the past, because that is on record. To me, there is a record; we have, after the second Pokharan test, the recorded speech of the then PM, in the General Assembly of the United Nations. From these records we find that we are de facto going to sign CTBT; it is a matter of time to put it de jure... These are the records — something has come in print. The principal negotiator, on behalf of the USA with our Foreign Minister, Strobe Talbott — the book is available; it is in the market.”

Lalu Prasad Yadav: “Jaswantji -

Talbott, what has he written? You must read what he’s written here, you are all educated people... I will read the relevant part (reads) ‘Jaswant, visibly taken aback by Sandy’s vehemence, insisted that Vajpayee had made an irreversible decision to sign the CTBT’. This means that we cannot contradict the decision. Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee has taken this decision. When and where, let this be announced, it is not just Jaswantji, but Vajpayee’s speech is on UN record, stating that the CTBT must be signed.”

Vajpayee’s UN speech

India, having harmonised its national imperatives and security obligations and desirous of continuing to cooperate with the international community is now engaged in discussions with key interlocutors on a range of issues, including the CTBT. We are prepared to bring these discussions to a successful conclusion, so that the entry into force of the CTBT is not delayed beyond September 1999 ... These tests do not signal a dilution of India’s commitment to the pursuit of global nuclear disarmament. Accordingly, after concluding this limited testing programme, India announced a voluntary moratorium on further underground nuclear test explosions. We conveyed our willingness to move towards a de jure formalisation of this obligation. In announcing a moratorium, India has already accepted the basic obligation of the CTBT. (p126)

Jaswant Singh’s stand

When Sandy Berger, key White House aide, expressed disappointment with Vajpayee’s waffling on the CTBT commitment in a letter to Bill Clinton — ‘Jaswant, visibly taken aback by Sandy’s vehemence, insisted that Vajpayee had made an “irreversible” decision to sign the CTBT - it was just a question of how and when to make the decision public. “If he’s made a decision,” said Sandy, “then it should be easier for him to say it at the UN.” Jaswant urged Sandy not to look at the Vajpayee letter in a vacuum. The prime minister was constrained from going too far in public, but Jaswant was giving private assurances: “It would be ironic and tragic if the success of what we’re trying to do all hinged on phraseology.” The United States should make the most of what was the best India could do under current circumstances.’ (p123)

Extracts from ‘Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb’ by Strobe Talbott

editor@expressindia.com