




Musharraf had become very unpopular, and so had the army. In his hubris he had committed many political mistakes, especially the decision to sack the chief justice not once but twice, in an unseemly and crude manner. The handling of the Lal Masjid episode had left many puzzled about its apparent procrastination; the eventual loss of life caused anguish. The killing of the Baluch leader, Bugti, was not calculated to enhance Musharraf’s political reputation or his popularity in that restive province. Most importantly, it was his military action against religious extremists in the tribal areas that touched a raw nerve as he was seen as killing his own people at the behest of the Americans. Pakistan’s economy also took a downturn, denting his claims about how efficiently the country’s affairs were being managed.
What he did not say was that he was wily as a fox, nimble on his feet, managed the Americans astutely, extracted economic and military aid from them for his cooperation, tried to protect Pakistan’s interests to its west by differentiating between al Qaeda and the Taliban, aiding the latter surreptitiously in order to protect Pakistan’s long-term interests in Afghanistan. He played his weak hand well. He persuaded India that Pakistan was equally a victim of terrorism, reversing the entrenched Indian position on Pakistan’s complicity in promoting terrorism in India. We failed to distinguish between the source of the terrorist threat in Pakistan, which was a backlash of his policy of cooperation with the United States, and the source of Pakistan-inspired terrorism against us. He achieved the objective of not having to fight on two fronts by scaling down tensions with India.
... contd.


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