Several weeks ago, the chances of a nuclear deal with India anytime soon seemed unlikely. There was considerable skepticism about the merits of the proposal in the US Congress, which had to vote on a bill to make India an exception to American nuclear nonproliferation legislation.

The debate on the issue seemed headed for the familiar partisan wrangling in an important election year.

Congressman Tom Lantos, one of the bill’s strongest supporters, voiced the uncertainty of a favorable result, by suggesting delaying a definitive vote. Yet, when the draft bills came before the relevant foreign relations committees of the two houses of the US Congress in the last week of June, the mood was much more positive.

Several senators at the June 29 legislative mark-up used the word “trust” to characterise their belief that the proposal will not undermine US nuclear nonproliferation goals. Still others argued that the likely strategic gains of close association with a rising India far outweighed the risks to nuclear nonproliferation.

On the eve of the June 29 meeting, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Republican Party majority leader Richard Lugar described the nuclear pact as the most important strategic diplomatic initiative undertaken by President George W Bush—a sentiment echoed by both Democratic and Republican senators as they voted 15 to 2 in favor of the bill.

Members of the House International Relations Committee two days earlier, with almost identical sentiments expressed, voted 37 to 5 for a similar bill.

The two houses of Congress will almost certainly support a nuclear deal by an overwhelming margin with support from the leadership of both major political parties, making this initiative one of the few significant trouble-free policies of the Bush administration.

What happened to turn this widespread skepticism into trust?

I think there are three explanations.

First was the judicious White House decision to support a modification of the draft bill to give the Congress a role in the implementation of the deal that was missing in its original version. Second, the supporters were quite effective in convincing members of Congress that the strategic gains outweighed the risks to nuclear nonproliferation. Third and perhaps most important, was vigorous lobbying, especially the efforts of the increasingly influential Indian-American community.

The Bush administration—for tactical reasons—had largely kept Congress uninformed about the initiative to make India an exception to US nonproliferation legislation, a decision that deeply antagonized both Republican and Democratic legislators. They were also angry that the administration’s draft bill lacked Congressional oversight over a proposal that is a dramatic departure from long-established nonproliferation policy.

Heeding the advice of senior representatives from both parties who support the nuclear deal, the administration agreed to revisions that would require a Congressional vote on the actual US nuclear deal (which is still under negotiation). This vote will take place after a mandated report to the Congress on the results of the US Indian negotiations, as well the results of India’s negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the reaction of the 45-country Nuclear Suppliers’ Group.

The legislative process will involve first an up/down vote—probably to take place within the next month or two—on the principle of making India an exception to US nonproliferation policy. This then will be followed by another Congressional vote, probably late this year, on the deal itself.

The opponents of the bill had moved fast to barrage the Congress and the press with arguments characterising the bill as a near fatal blow to nonproliferation without the redeeming prospect of any real strategic gains.

Most members of Congress have limited knowledge of the oft-arcane world of nuclear nonproliferation and rely heavily for information in this area on a few informed colleagues, the Congressional leadership and the press.

The opponents came close to setting the terms of the debate. While raising legitimate concerns that the deal will enable India to divert nuclear fuel to expand its weapons arsenal and that other nuclear wanabees will be emboldened by an exception for India, they failed to convince most members of Congress that these were inevitable outcomes.

One reason for their lack of success was the often-exaggerated nature of their presentation. Yet another reason was the obvious gain for nonproliferation by India’s decision to place most of its nuclear reactors under IAEA safeguards provisions. Moreover, the strategic importance of India , with its booming economy was obvious. A further advantage was the plausible connection between a positive vote and increased US trade with India. It became clear that voting this bill down or loading it with deal-busting amendments will set back a relationship with a country that is rapidly becoming one of the key players on the Asian scene.

The Indian American community, working with the administration and powerful groups like the US Chamber of Commerce, demonstrated its influence in the US politics as it lobbied for the passage of this bill. Their success demonstrated that Indians in the US had become a political force to reckon with.

Community activists prepared widely distributed briefs, arguing that the bill was good for both nonproliferation and US strategic concerns. Beyond this, there was also the implicit threat of withdrawing support from members of Congress who voted against the nuclear deal.

Indian Americans are quickly learning the ways of hardball American politics. The New York Times on June 5, ran a front page story by a writer who was both surprised and impressed by the sophisticated lobbying campaign of the Indian American community on behalf of the nuclear deal. Of the several national political action groups formed by the community over the past decade, the most active and least factionalised has been the US Indian Political Action Committee. Over the past few weeks, it has coached the community on how to organize a massive letter writing campaign to members of Congress, keeping a running account of how members stand on this bill. The Indian American press has further publicised this lobbying.

Perhaps the most significant domestic political development to come of this intense lobbying is the enhanced political self-confidence of the two million strong Indian American community. They have the financial resources and the organisational capacity to be a powerhouse in American politics and they are learning how to use these assets to advance their interests.

The Bush administration, in its own lobbying of the Congress, has wisely focused on the larger strategic and economic advantages the US will gain. It has beaten back efforts to attach binding amendments that would limit India’s nuclear options. The battle is not yet over, as some opponents still want to attach such binding amendments to the bill when its comes up for a final vote, but the vote of the two Congressional committees in June suggests that what emerges from the Congress will be acceptable both to Manmohan Singh and George W Bush.

The writer is Associate Director, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC

editor@expressindia.com