If there is anything more important for the Indian Air Force than defending the country, it is to ensure cost of such defence is minimum. Thus, while we must train and prepare for perhaps the most demanding profession on Earth, we aim to ensure accidents are kept to the lowest levels.

The reality is since man was never meant to fly, and especially fly in fast and highly manoeuvrable jet fighters that require split-second responses, there are occasions when things go wrong. Many ponderables and imponderables combine to cause accidents.

But if there is anything that hurts the IAF internally is the loss of an aircraft and even more painful, the loss of precious lives. Every loss of aircraft means that one less operational aircraft is available for the country’s defence. As regards loss of life, this amounts to not just the loss of a trained combat pilot, but also a family member.

People like P. Chidambaram (‘‘Where Life is Cheap’’, July 27) who claim the IAF treats life cheap know little about the Air Force, its ethos, traditions, and professionalism. His column may be called Politically Correct but it is not factually correct. Allow me to outline some bare facts.

MiGs are the mainstay of the IAF and have been so for three decades. The IAF has different types of MiGs — the MiG-21, MiG-23BN, MiG-23MF, MiG 25, MiG-27 and MiG-29. There is an unfortunate tendency to club them together.

Most people are not aware that the MiG-21 has 21 variants of which 10 have served in the IAF. These are the Type 74, Type 76, Type 77, Type 96B, Type 96, Type 75, the Bison (upgraded MiG-21), and the two-seater Type 66, Type 69 and the Type 69B.

All these types were inducted into service between 1969-1976. Each one is a modified improvement of the earlier variant, with the last of the aircraft being manufactured in 1989.

Three different types of engines equip these fighters and trainers. Every sub-system and component of the aircraft, including its engine and airframe, has a design life after which it is replaced.

The aircraft and its systems are subject to scheduled maintenance ranging from pre-flight to between flights, daily and weekly inspections, and overhaul at defined intervals. The criteria for airworthiness are the serviceability of the aircraft and its systems within its design life-cycle. There is no arbitrary concept of ‘‘age’’.

The basic truth is an aircraft is either serviceable or it is not, irrespective of age. There is no halfway house in military aviation and this must be clearly understood. Therefore, contrary to what is often conveyed in the media, the IAF does not fly unserviceable, unfit or non-airworthy aircraft.

No air force in the world phases out its aircraft merely because of age. They are periodically refurbished and upgraded. In most cases, phasing out is done either because technologically the aircraft is markedly inferior to its potential challenger, or because it has completed its design life.

The United States Air Force still flies the B-52 aircraft, which is 45 years old. The IAF still uses the Canberra, introduced in 1957.

One has to look at MiG-21 accidents in perspective. The MiG-21 fleet comprises 47 per cent of the total fighter inventory of the IAF and yet accounts for nearly 70 per cent of total sorties flown by the IAF’s fighter fleet. In the absence of an advanced jet trainer, the IAF is compelled to use the MiG-21 as an operational trainer.

Though the MiG-21 technology is of 1960s or 1970s vintage it does not automatically follow that it is unsafe to fly. It is unfair that the sobriquet of ‘‘Flying Coffin’’ has been conferred on a truly versatile flying machine.

In 1999, the aircraft proved its worth as a frontline combat aircraft in Kargil and again when a MiG-21 shot down a Pakistani Atlantique aircraft which intruded across the border.

It is unfortunate that eminent people have publicly questioned the integrity of the IAF. The IAF has in practice one of the most scientific approaches to flight safety. The number of fighter aircraft lost in accidents has been progressively coming down, from 30 per year in the 1980s to 23 per year in the 1990s. It is now 18 per year.

Fighter flying is intrinsically hazardous. Man and machine have to operate at the limit of their capability. In aviation, even a small mistake in judgment or skill could lead to disaster. Human failure, whether at the level of design, manufacture, maintenance or flying, could individually or collectively lead to such mistakes. The goal of the IAF’s flight safety programme is to ensure these errors don’t happen. When they do, it is to investigate the failure and prevent recurrence.