Despite the tall talk about their relationship acquiring “a global and strategic character”, India and China have had no choice but to focus on clearing the debris from their turbulent past. Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Wen Jiabao deserve applause for coming up with a set of guiding principles to resolve their boundary dispute, which has dogged the two nations ever since their date with modern territorial statehood. A pretense of friendship in the mid-’50s, a war in ’62, and a cautious engagement since the late ’80s did not produce any forward movement on the boundary dispute. This history makes Monday’s agreement on the “guiding principles and political parameters” for the resolution of the boundary dispute a big breakthrough.

Building on the earlier initiatives of Rajiv Gandhi and A.B. Vajpayee, the Manmohan Singh government has now codified the elements of a boundary deal with China. Article III underlines the importance of “meaningful and mutually acceptable adjustments to their respective positions”. Translation: both sides have to make territorial concessions. The nature of this give and take is identified in Articles IV and VII. Article IV endorses Chinese claim on Aksai Chin in the Western sector by stating that “due consideration” should be given to each other’s “strategic and reasonable interests”. Aksai Chin is strategic piece of real estate that links two of China’s sensitive border provinces, Tibet and Xinjiang. Article VII protects India’s claims in Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector, by safeguarding the “due interests of their settled populations in the border areas”. Senior officials will translate this broad swap of claims on Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh into specifics (Article X). Experts will delineate and demarcate the linear boundary by using geographic principles, modern cartography and joint surveys (Article VI and VIII).