Balochistan, with its long coastline on the Arabian Sea and deep reserves of minerals and natural gas, is in the throes of unrest after the death of a power feudal chieftain in an army operation. After the killing of Sardar Akbar Bugti in an operation by the Pakistan Army, the media is rife with all kinds of parallels — to 1971, 1973 and 1979.

What does that mean?

The 1971 reference is to the momentum set in the months preceding the formation of Bangladesh. In 1979, then prime minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was hanged during military rule under General Zia-ul Haq. That killing touched off a new stridency in Sindhi nationalism and commentators in Pakistan fear that by rendering Bugti a martyr, the army has galvanised Baloch nationalism. This development could enable the rebels to overcome the divisions and tensions among the three most powerful Baloch tribes — the Bugtis, Marris, and Mengals.

And 1973?

It refers to the third armed conflict in Balochistan, the first two being in 1948 and 1958. In 1973, Bhutto, then prime minister, dismissed the Baloch provincial government, a coalition of the local People’s Party, originally launched by the Khan of Kalat, with the Jamiat Ulema Islam. The pretext was the discovery of arms at the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad. These, claimed the government, were meant for a Baloch rebellion.

The dismissal of Ataullah Mengal’s government immediately sparked a full-fledged armed insurrection that drew in its fold various strands — from Soviet influenced Sardars to feudal chiefs anxious about losing a traditional way of life and governance to urban intellectuals, dreaming of a Marxist revolution. It brought in the Pakistani army, and over the next four years, 5,300 rebels, 3,300 army personnel and an unspecified number of civilians died. Violence ended after Zia arrived at a political truce with the Baloch leaders.

Is there a common thread?

Yes, in the sense that Balochs remain fearful of being marginalised in their own land. From the beginning, they have resented their minuscule representation in government jobs and Islamabad’s refusal to allow greater autonomy. The current phase of tension began in January 2005 after the rape of a doctor by soldiers in Sui. Inaction against the guilty sparked off attacks on natural gas installations, a sign of the Balochs’ estrangement from development.

Balochistan — with four per cent of Pakistan’s population and 43 per cent of its land mass, according to figures in a recent Carnegie paper by Pakistan scholar Frederic Grare, holds great natural resources and strategic significance. Besides mineral wealth, it supplies more than 40 per cent of the gas consumed by Pakistan. Balochs have been demanding higher royalties and a say in how their energy reserves are utilised. (Grare cites a government study that by 2012 the gas deposits being exploited will run out.)

Allied to this is resentment that Balochs do not obtain jobs in other development projects, like the Gwadar deep-sea port being built with Chinese assistance, the three new cantonment towns being created and the Ormara naval base on the Makran base projected to become Pakistan’s second largest naval installation.

What next?

Writes Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid: “By killing Bugti, the president (General Pervez Musharraf) has earned the permanent enmity of not just the Baloch rebels but the wider Baloch population who may not believe in taking up arms, but are still frustrated with Islamabad for its failure to develop the province.”

There is concern about how it will impact Islamabad’s leverage in conducting political negotiation in the province. General and provincial elections are to be held by January 2008.

How crucial is India's official reaction?

Extremely. The foreign office spokesperson expressed regret over Bugti’s killing and said military force cannot be a solution. He emphasised on the “need for peaceful dialogue to address the grievance and aspiration of the people of Balochistan”. If that sounds uncannily like sermons routinely issued by Islamabad — on J-K, on Ayodhya, on Gujarat — it is part of a strategy adopted by New Delhi over the last couple of years. In the past, India would maintain discreet silence over developments in PoK, Baltistan-Gilgit and Balochistan. That old defensive mindset has been junked. It is evident from the issuance by the Pakistan foreign office of a retort that was for most of the 1990s stock Indian outrage: don’t comment on our internal affairs.

editor@expressindia.com

Ads By Google