Opinion Game changer

The timing,place and nature of special operation forces in the Chintalnar attack need to be analysed. The attack was carried out from a hilltop by around 1,000 armed cadres with IEDs,LMGs and AK series rifles. The attack took place in the early morning while the CRPF platoons were returning to their base camp after opening a road for the troops to begin an area domination operation,codenamed Operation Green Hunt,against the Maoists,for three days in the jungles. Interestingly,the platoon returned without any encounter with Maoists during their operations in the jungles. They were confident,complacent and in a relaxed mood. It seemed they were under the impression that they had driven out Maoist armed cadres and the area was free from any danger. But unfortunately the SFs were not aware of the Maoist tactics. The Maoists had allowed them unhindered access to the area to conduct their operation,which must have added to their level of complacency.

As the reports suggest,the SFs were attacked from six different directions. It was initiated with an IED explosion followed by ambush with automatic rifles to cause maximum casualties on the enemy. It was meticulously planned with strong local intelligence. The precision of the attack indicates the possibility of some moles in the CRPF camp. The Maoists were well aware of the return plan of the platoons. They also knew that the platoons were tired after the operation.

It is well-known that while Maoists are heavily dependent on the militia,the police have lost the confidence of the locals,which affects their intelligence. It is difficult for paramilitary forces to operate in a Maoist affected area with zero intelligence. That gives Maoists an upper hand over the paramilitary forces. One of the major weaknesses of the CRPF in this region has been its dependence on special police officers (SPOs),who are recruited from the Salwa Judum groups in the Bastar region. It is also suspected that some SPOs are in touch with Maoists.

Moreover,Maoists have made elaborate arrangements to counter any kind of anti-Maoist operations in their strategic areas. The CPI-Maoist politburo has already passed a resolution to prepare and mobilise the entire party and their sympathisers. As part of this strategy,the central military commission was asked to plant landmines to protect their so-called strategic areas like in Malkangiri,Gadchiroli,Maad region in Chhattisgarh and Sarenda forest in Jharkhand. Simultaneously,their front organisations were mobilised to form a human chain in those strategic areas and carry out demonstrations against the operations in urban areas. Last but not least,in such cases,since Maoists are already aware of the operation,they usually disperse,relocate their forces,and either dump their weapons in a safe place or form smaller attack groups to carry out attacks on security forces. They also move their strike or action groups out of their strategic locations to avoid any confrontation with the security forces. According to the police sources,Katakam Sudarshan alias Anand is a central committee member of the CPI-Maoist who was assigned to stall the joint operations including Operation Green Hunt in Chhattisgarh.

While the Maoists are all set for a long battle,the affected states are running short of trained manpower,logistics and local intelligence. According to the Comptroller and Auditor General report in March 2010,Chhattisgarh is short of 20 per cent of the required weapons. The report says: “The police headquarters had assessed a total requirement of 47,265 units (of weapons) under various categories,against which the availability was 37,911 units only. Therefore,there was an overall shortage of 9,354 units (20 per cent of the requirement) for the whole state.” There is also differences of opinion between some affected states and the Union government on tackling the menace.

There are allegations that the local police also do not pass the information to concerned authorities to avoid taking any risk to their lives and family members. Immediately after the Chintalnar attack,Chhattisgarh State Home Minister Nankiram Kanwar admitted that there was poor “coordination between state police and paramilitary force”. For example,the Mizo battalion deployed in the Sukma area in 2007 had huge coordination problems with local police officers. Second,in Chhattisgarh,many local police personnel do not want to cooperate because they have been posted in that area for more than their assigned years.

This kind of attack is neither a victory for the Maoists nor a defeat for the state. Such attacks are inevitable while both the state and Maoists try to dominate a particular area. Instead of carelessly deploying security forces in the jungles,there is a need for taking adequate action to block the resources and small-arms supply routes of the Maoists to prevent such losses in future.

The writer is associate fellow,Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. His research area is the Maoist insurgency in South Asia